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ABSTRACT

The aim of this project works against the stigmatization of Middle Eastern women in the West by
examining women’s experiences of resistance and agency within the diaspora and in Iran.
Through a feminist ethnographic analysis of Iranian women's narratives, I work against Western
stereotypes as a way to problematize the assumption that immersion in Western culture "saves"
Middle Eastern women from their supposed cultural and religious "victimization." The focus of
my inquiry is centered on four issues, or themes, of analysis, which are: everyday acts of
resistance, subversion, and negotiation, issues of dress, household dynamics, and women's values
and self-expression. Drawing on secondary academic research (including anthropology, critical
and comparative gender studies, and transnational feminist theory), this project is designed to
further understand how the dynamics of subversion, resistance, and agency that take place within
the micro-practices of these women's daily lives impact their ability to exercise individual
agency against societal limitations and against the State at large. Within this analysis, I look at
issues of consumption, sexuality, and dress as a way to understand how the participants exercise
resistance and agency in two markedly different cultural contexts. I argue that despite common
assumptions made about Middle Eastern women in the West, Iranian women exercise as much, if
not more, social agency in Iran as they do in America.
Keywords: Iranian Diaspora, Transnational Feminism, Ethnography, Gender, Youth, Agency,
Resistance, Consumption
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Introduction: Overview of Research and Background of Study
Introduction and Statement of the Question
In 2007 author and illustrator Marjane Satrapi and director Vincent Parannaud released
Persepolis: The Story of a Childhood, an animation film based on Marjane Satrapi’s graphic
novel published just four years prior.1 Based on an autobiographical narrative, Persepolis depicts
the story of a society in transition and the political upheaval experienced during the Iranian
revolution of 1979. It is a story of social and class conflict, generational difference, and the
renegotiation of public and private spaces.2 It is a time of political revolution and populist
uprisings, told from the perspective of Marjane, Satrapi’s child-self, whose coming-of-age story
highlights her journey through adolescence during a time of political upheaval and transition in
post-revolutionary Iran.
The storyline follows the life of this child protagonist, which is marked by her proWestern family’s sympathies in support of the revolution and their subsequent hostility toward
the religious authorities after they come to power. Chronicling her journey through childhood
and adolescence, Satrapi’s story depicts her experiences as a child of secular, leftist parents who
increasingly fear for their daughter’s safety in a highly volatile and politically charged
environment.
In hopes of providing a more secure and stable environment outside of post-revolutionary
Iran, Marjane’s parents send their daughter abroad to Vienna, where she remains for several
years. As a high school student abroad, Marjane experienced cultural displacement and often felt
estranged from her non-Iranian peers. Although Marjane longed for her homeland, her return to
1

“Interview with Marjane Satrapi—Director/Author of Persepolis,” Payvand News, (December 2007),
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1254.html (accessed May 8, 2011).
2
Tom Prasch, review of Persepolis, directed by Marjane Satrapi and Vincent Parannaud, An Interdisciplinary
Jouranl of Film and Television Studies 38, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 80.
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her country was marked with similar feelings of dislocation, as a young woman who had
experienced many of her formative years outside of Iran.
Her experiences as an adolescent and young woman in Austria and back home, in Iran,
demonstrates how social agency and resistance manifest themselves differently in each of these
contexts, breaking down over-simplified categorizations of East and West. Satrapi’s Persepolis
has been hailed as a story which humanizes the adolescent experience in post-revolutionary Iran,
and which makes explicit the social complexities of a society in a state of radical political
transformation.3 As a young Iranian adolescent who embraces British Punk Rock, or as a teenage
girl whose tenacious disposition leads her to frequent encounters with post-revolution state
authorities, Marjane’s character tells the story of a young woman who comes of age during one
of the most tumultuous period’s in Iran’s recent history. As authors Nima Naghibi and Andrew
O’Malley suggest, Persepolis has “…force[d] the Western reader to work hard to understand the
complexities of contemporary Iranian politics and social dynamics…”4
In fact, in a recent interview with MTV music Satrapi argues, “It has to stop being, you
know, this very simplistic idea that, you know, the world is divided between East and West and
Muslim and Christian. If there is one division in the world it’s between the stupid guy and the
intelligent guy-it stops there.”5 In what has become a growing trend among those living in the
diaspora, Iranian female writers like Satrapi have utilized literary and media pieces to “…write
themselves back into the history of the [Iranian] nation” and to counter the stereotypes of the

3

Nima Naghibi and Andrew O’Malley. “Estranging the Familiar: “East” and “West” in Satrapi’s Persepolis,”
English Studies in Canada 31, no. 2-3 (June/September 2005): 224.
4
Ibid., 224.
5
MTV News, “Eastern Values Battle Western Decadence. ‘Persepolis’: A Young Girl’s Fight for Freedom.” MTV
News Website, Windows Media Player media file, 00:54, http://www.mtv.com/videos/news/197335/eastern-valuesbattle-western-decadence.jhtml (accessed August 12, 2011).
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“self-effacing, modest Iranian woman.”6 In this way Marjane Satrapi’s graphic-novel Persepolis
(and later the cinematic production), has been extraordinarily successful at redefining
oversimplified categorizations of Middle Eastern women.
The aim of this project employs a similar objective: to work against the stigmatization of
Middle Eastern women in the West by examining experiences of resistance and agency in both
Iran and America. Through an analysis of a select group of young Iranian women’s narratives, I
work against prevailing stereotypes as a way to problematize the assumption that immersion in
Western culture “saves” Middle Eastern women from their supposed cultural and religious
“victimization.”7 The focus of my inquiry is centered on four issues, or themes of analysis, which
are: everyday acts of resistance, issues of dress, household dynamics, and women’s values and
self-expression. Drawing on secondary academic research, this project is designed to further
problematize those aforementioned suppositions made about Middle Eastern women (that imply
passivity and victimization) by positioning Iranian women’s personal narratives central to my
research question and analysis. I argue that despite common assumptions made about Iranian
society and about those women living in it, Iranian women exercise as much, if not more,
political and social agency in Iran as they do in America.
General Research Hypotheses and Delimitations of the Study
Situating my analysis in a historical and theoretical understanding of contemporary
Iranian history, I juxtapose contemporary Iranian gender discourses in terms of my primary
(interviews) and secondary (literature) forms of research, specifically as they relate to four
themes: acts of cultural resistance, issues of dress and fashion, house-hold dynamics, and values
6

Nima Naghibi and Andrew O’Malley. “Estraging the Familiar: “East” and “West” in Satrapi’s Persepolis,” English
Studies in Canada 31, no. 2-3 (June/September 2005): 224.
7
Lila Abu Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism
and Its Others,” American Anthropologist, 104 no. 3 (2002): 785.
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and self-expression. Specifically, I focus on these areas of inquiry as a way to compare and
contrast acts of subversion, agency, and subjectivity in Iran and America. By comparing their
experiences in both contexts, I will be able to further understand the dynamics of inter-personal
relationships (familial and romantic), resistance to restrictive and formally imposed dress codes
and perceptions of American fashion, as well as their sense of autonomy and self-determination
(both personally and professionally) in both cultural contexts.
Interview participants are comprised of a select group of transnational, middle-class
female university students, who were born in and grew up in Iran and then later migrated to the
United States. Their stories emphasize the detailed aspects of their social lives, as young students
and professionals who are engaged in Iran’s youth culture and society. The specificity of this
study is based on a number of criteria, including gender, class, age, and generation. The
demographic criteria of this study were delimited to Iranian women born during or after the
Iranian Revolution (1979), which places them all in the under-35 age bracket.
Interest in this project emerged out of previous academic research on Iranian women and
youth in post-revolutionary Iran. Specifically, those in recent decades who have received
growing international attention because of their considerable population size, their distinctive
‘youth’ culture, and the formal and informal resistive strategies employed against an increasingly
authoritarian regime, most notably during the country’s 2009 presidential elections.8 Of some 70
million Iranians, approximately 60% are under the age of thirty.9 All of the interview participants
were born during or after the revolution, and like their peers, they believe their generation is
politically aware because they see this as the only viable option to bring about change in what

8

Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2010), 122.
9
Bruce Feiler, Generation Freedom: The Middle East Uprisings and the Remaking of the Modern World (New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2011), 47.
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they perceive as a restrictive society. An almost decade-long war with Iraq, which killed
hundreds of thousands of young Iranian men, as well as the rise of a large educated urban
middle-class population, are two important factors to also consider in this analysis. Furthermore,
a permissive style of upbringing in conjunction with the opening up of cultural spaces during the
1990s, as well as the increasing impact of globalization and intercultural exchange, has impacted
the individualization of today’s Iranian youth population.10
Other social and economic factors, such as high rates of inflation, the increasing demand
for dual-income households, and greater access to educational opportunities have created specific
opportunities for negotiation and subversion of State-imposed laws and ideologies for young
Iranian women.11 The dynamics between the State and Iran’s youth population have in the
decades following the revolution become increasingly stifled and distant, largely due to changing
attitudes among Iran’s younger population as well as repressive tactics employed by some of
those in charge. Instances of harassment and even arrest by the morality police12, an increasingly
restrictive social atmosphere, and laws and social pressures that prohibit women from realizing
full equality, are according to some participants, what make Iran’s younger population the
driving force in the contentious struggle for the country’s future.

10
Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, “From Motherhood to Equal Rights Advocates: The Weakening of the Patriarchal Order,”
Iranian Studies 38 (March 2005): 46.
11
Ibid., 47.
12
The first morality police units were established by religious authorities in 1979, shortly after the revolution, as a
way to discipline violators of “moral crimes,” such as alcohol consumption, extra-marital relationships, and
gambling. Arrests were frequent in the months following the populist uprising, and hundreds of innocent individuals
were executed as a result of alleged ‘morality’ violations. During the 1980s the power of the morality police was
almost infallible, but its authority in recent decades has waxed and waned. Activists and political reformists worked
against the abusive powers of the morality police, and resistance by Iran’s growing youth population has largely
diminished this organizations’ collective power. However, since conservatives garnered power in the early years of
the 2000s, there has been a renewed crackdown on ‘morality’ violations, including arrests of young people dressed
‘un-Islamically,’ and confiscation of satellite dishes. Since 2007, there has been an increased presence of morality
police and basiji (volunteer militia employed by the government to quash political opposition and social unrest), as
well as an increased numbers of arrests and imprisonments. Azam Khatam, “The Islamic Republic’s Failed Quest
for the Spotless City,” Middle East Report 250 (Spring 2009): 44.
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Through the telling of their stories, many of the participants have intimated that the
“personal is political”13 for young people in Iran, as they routinely employ intentional acts of
resistance in their everyday lives, against the ebb and flow of a stifling political and social
environment. In recent decades, many Iranian women have by and large defied social norms of
gender conservatism and accessed a myriad of professional and educational opportunities within
the country. In her discussion of Islamic feminist’s activism in Iran in the late 1990s, Afsaneh
Najmabadi writes, “Almost two decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, against the
deepest fears of many of the secular feminist activities of the revolution, not only have women
not disappeared from public life, but they have an unmistakably active presence in practically
every field of artistic creation, professional achievement, educational and industrial institutions,
and even in sports activities.”14
Despite its laws that favor men in areas such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance
laws, women are increasingly present and active in the country’s universities, much of which
comes as a result of the state’s investment in its educational system and the massive public
infrastructural improvements made during the late 1980s and 90s. The country’s youth
population—both men and women—are an incredibly accomplished group of people. In fact,
recent statistics show that as of 2003 women comprised approximately 62% of the university’s
students and literacy rates for individuals under the age of 24 measures near 100%.15 Younger
people are also heavily engaged in civic activism (both informal and formal), as was
demonstrated in the historic protests against the presidential elections in 2009. In fact, in the last
13

This quotation was originally used as a title to a ground-breaking article written by radical feminist and civil rights
activist Carol Hanish, in 1969. “Personal is Political” was published as part of a collection of works under the title,
“Notes From the Second Year: Women’s Liberation: Major Writings of the Radical Feminists” in 1970.
14
Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Feminism in an Islamic Republic: “Years of Hardship, Years of Growth”” in Islam, Gender,
and Social Change edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), 59.
15
Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, “From Motherhood to Equal Rights Advocates: The Weakening of the Patriarchal Order,”
Iranian Studies 38 (March 2005): 48.
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decade alone youth are responsible for the establishment of hundreds of NGO’s through formal
channels and informal networking.16
Young Iranian women and men have utilized technology, underground sub-culture
movements, and ‘ordinary,’ everyday acts of resistance (e.g. through dress) to subvert and/or
negotiate the religious politics of the State.17 In fact, several interview participants have utilized
the internet to circumvent social restrictions and as a tool for resistance and self-expression.
Interview participant Parastoo, a 27-year-old Iranian woman, engages in web-logging, or
blogging, as a way to communicate with other Iranians and to engage in political and social
discussions openly, without the confines of social restriction. Asal, a 27-year-old ArmenianIranian Christian, met her Iranian Muslim fiancé through a mutual acquaintance in an online
chat-room. Such encounters demonstrate how the internet and ‘cyberspace’ have allowed
individuals to push the boundaries of social expectations and to engage in subversive behavior
against State-imposed restrictions. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone echoes a similar sentiment:
“Cyberspace provides a public social space that allows free expression of self outside the
confines of the politically manipulated physical space. Here a young, independent woman can
have mastery over her environment and assert her agency…”18
While this argument is certainly valid for many young women who participate in online
activities as a form of social networking and as a way to articulate a sense of self, this has not
prevented instances of criticism and judgment for this particular population. While the internet
offers a space of potential anonymity, it also offers an opportunity for unfettered judgment from

16

Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2007), 126.
17
Ibid., 123.
18
Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone, “Wings of Freedom: Iranian Women, Identity, and Cyberspace” in On Shifting
Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York City, NY: Feminist Press at
the City University of New York, 2005), 63.
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public viewers to bloggers, especially if bloggers’ identities as young women are revealed to
viewers. In these instances, the internet transforms into a space of relative anonymity into a place
of social limitations and self-censorship.19
This study examines the experiences of this particular population—young, middle-class,
educated women, who have moved to the United States to study, live, or work—as a way to
further understand how immersion in American and Western culture impacts their selfconceptualization as women from the Middle East. Working against the assumption that Western
culture “saves” Middle Eastern women from “victimized” lives, I compare the participants’
experiences of political and social agency in both Iran and in America as a way to further
problematize this argument. In no way do I claim this project’s findings and the limited
participating sample population is representative of the country’s urban, middle-class female
population as a whole. Rather, its purpose is to highlight individual narratives and experiences as
a way to create a more critical understanding of Iranian women’s ability to exercise agency and
autonomy within two markedly distinct cultural and social contexts. The conclusions drawn from
these interviews, as well as from secondary research done on contemporary Iranian youth
culture, point toward the idea that, despite the confines of social and legal limitations, Iranian
women exercise more agency and demonstrate an extraordinary capacity for individual
resistance against these social and political restrictions within their home country than as
immigrant women living in the United States.
Methodology of the Study
Selected methodology includes a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews,
academic and scholarly literature (anthropology, critical and comparative gender studies, and
19

Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi, “Performance in Everyday Life and the Rediscovery of the “Self” in Iranian Weblogs,”
Bad Jens: Iranian Feminist Newsletter, 7 ed. (September 2004), http://www.badjens.com/rediscovery.html
(accessed August 2, 2011).
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transnational feminist publications). In this analysis, I consider several theoretical frameworks,
including the diasporic migration of Iranian communities, gender discourse and ethnicity, and the
effects of cultural displacement in diasporic communities. By situating myself within the
theoretical parameters of transnational feminism and feminist ethnography, I have become
critically aware of the potential limitations of writing an analysis of Iranian women’s experiences
in the diaspora.
Interview participants are comprised of a mixed group of Iranian students and
professionals residing in and around the Chicago-land area. These individuals were introduced to
me by acquaintances or referred by fellow classmates and/or professionals. Participation in the
research process was entirely voluntary and after learning about my intentions with this project,
individuals seemed eager to talk about their experiences as Iranian women living in the United
States. The participant pool was delimited to female Iranians between the ages of 18 and 35. The
interview is semi-structured, and follows the natural flow of conversation. This is the most
appropriate method for this type of oral history collection since it allows for the most flexibility
and opportunities to build rapport.20 Guiding interview questions touch on specific themes,
which include acts of resistance, issues of dress and veiling, household dynamics, and values and
self-expression. More specific questions include inquiries about the representation of Middle
Eastern women in Western media, the differences and/or similarities in social expectations
between Iran and America, and the daily experiences of their lives as “foreigners” in a Western
urban space. I am specifically interested in learning how their experiences as professionals,
students, and women in Chicago compare and contrast with life in Iran. While the focus of my

20

Harvey Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 4th Ed.
(Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2006): 214.
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inquiry rests on this area in question, the flow of conversation has been largely determined by the
interview participant.
The interview participants express a wide range of interpretations, responses, and
opinions on the politics of gender identity and self-conceptualization as Iranian women in
America and in Iran. While the sampling of interview participants is small in size, the
information gleaned from these interactions offers an in-depth look into women’s experiences of
social agency in two markedly different cultural contexts. In particular, our conversations have
revolved around issues of dress, mixed-sex interactions, and sexual double standards. Interviews
have only been recorded with permission and for discretionary purposes, pseudonyms have been
used. Also, other identifiable information (such as the educational institution or place of work)
may have been also been changed during the interview process.
While I am the sole author of this textual product, the analytic interpretations I have made
consider dynamics of power and are grounded in principles of feminist ethnography. Utilizing
transnational feminism and feminist ethnographic praxis as both the theoretical and
methodological components throughout my research project has encouraged the ethical
interpretation of the interviews and final textual product.
Significance of the Study and Ethics of Research
The significance of this project lies in the contributions it makes to transnational feminist
scholarship and the continual integration of Western feminist rhetoric with non-Western centric
positionalities. By situating my project from a critical transnational feminist lens, I present
ethnographic accounts of Iranian women’s personal experiences as “non-Western” women living
in the United States. The primary aim of this project is centered on the inclusion of counternarratives to mainstream hegemonic discourses and dialogue. While Western mainstream
representations of Middle Eastern (especially Muslim women) are steeped in hegemonic
- 10 -

assumptions that imply lack of agency, passivity, and which further position non-Western
individuals from an ethnocentric perspective21, the goal of this project centers its inquiry on
countering such claims.
The representation of Middle Eastern women generally and Iranian women specifically in
post-9/11 mainstream Western media is saturated with homogenized images of passivity,
victimization, and oppression.22 In 2004 a study conducted on the representation of Iranian
women in U.S. media concluded that “…Iranian women will be portrayed either as meekly
house- or chador-bound, with only great piety to distinguish them, or as militantly Islamic.”23
While wearing the chador, Iranian women are described as “resigned” and “slipped into a
vestibule.” While in Western clothing, the representation of Iranian women includes such
phrases as “subtle,” “cheeky” and they “stride” and “show off” the latest European fashion.24
Similarly, other studies conclude that Muslim and Middle Eastern women are represented
in Western media only superficially, where their photographic images “…primarily reinforce
preexisting understandings of Muslim societies as irrational, hostile, and antithetical to the liberal
West.”25 Indeed, the “reductive interpretation” of the veil as a unilateral symbol of Muslim
women’s oppression by Muslim men has further perpetuated these assumptions about individuals
from this region and the cultural relativism that ensues from such ill-conceived conjectures.26
Further, it has been found that American news reporters and journalists will most often select
21

Contemporary references include works written by Faegheh Shirazi (2010), Inez Mahony (2010), Laura Navarro
(2010), Amir Saeed (2007), Smeeta Mishra (2007), Alia Salem Imtoual (2005), and Kevin J. Ayotte and Mary E.
Husain (2005).
22
Elli Lester Roushanzamir, “Chimera Veil of “Iranian Women” and Processes of U.S. Textual Commodification:
How U.S. Print Media Represent Iran,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2004): 18.
23
Ibid., 18.
24
Ibid., 19.
25
Ghazi-Walid Falah, “The visual representation of Muslim/Arab Women in Daily Newspapers in the United
States,” Geographies of Muslim Women: Gender, Religion, and Space, ed. Ghazi-Walid Falah and Caroline Negel
(New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 317.
26
Lila Abu Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism
and Its Others,” American Anthropologist, 104 no. 3 (2002): 786.
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“images with an exotic or unusual appeal” when covering stories about Muslim individuals
and/or the Middle East.27 As Paula Holmes-Eber argues, “Women in the Middle East—and
likewise the wearing of the veil—have become a symbol to Americans of everything we dislike
about this inexplicable part of the world, a representation of everything we fear about Islam, and
yet also a romantic and exotic image of our fantasies about the Middle East”.28
Therefore, the short- and long-term impacts of this type of research study,
notwithstanding the critical lessons I have personally gleaned as an aspiring scholar, include the
creation of palpable counter-narratives, which work against the cultural ‘othering’ of Iranian
women specifically and Middle Eastern women generally.29 Variables including language and
accents, names, culture, and national origin are, as Haideh Moghissi argues, what makes Iranian
“…identifiable as immigrants of Third World origin.”30 The epistemic violence incurred on
Middle Eastern people, and particularly Muslims, through the use of “distorted and exaggerated
images” perpetuates even further the orientalist rhetoric that subsumes Western media and
Western popular culture.31
In this sense, Iranians, like other individuals from the Middle East, face what Ali Rattansi
terms ‘cultural racism,’ where “generalizations, stereotypes, and other forms of cultural
essentialism” inform and reinforce dominant ideas about Middle Eastern people in popular
Western culture.32 Rattansi argues that cultural essentialism, the idea that social characteristics
are naturalized into indistinguishable biological features, draws on other aspects of “race” other
27

Paula Holmes-Eber, “Conceptions and Misconceptions of Women in the Middle East,” UW TV website,
University of Washington, http://www.uwtv.org/video/player.aspx?mediaid=1577094840Shirazi, (accessed August
12, 2011).
28
Ibid.
29
Haideh Moghissi “Away from Home: Iranian Women, Displacement, Cultural Resistance, and Change,” Journal
of Comparative Family Studies, 30 no. 2 (Spring 1999): 2.
30
Ibid. 2.
31
Ibid., 2.
32
Ali Rattansi, Racism: A Very Short Introduction, (Hampshire: Oxford University Press, 2007), 55.
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than biological features (such as skin color) to collectively demonize certain groups of people.33
He uses other notable comparisons, including the “supposed avariciousness of Jews” and the
“alleged aggressiveness of Africans and African-Americans” as two relevant, contemporary
examples.34
The continual rescue narrative that also subsumes Western mainstream media and
political landscape further complicates this matter. When First Lady Laura Bush declared her
support for the U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001, she declared that Afghan women
were “…rejoicing at their “liberation” by the Americans.”35 A statement such as this, perhaps
more than anything, demonstrates the rescue narrative that has plagued Western, colonial
movements and Western, white feminist activities since their very beginnings.36 Feminist
ethnographic research, therefore, encourages a participant-centric analysis and demands selfreflexive praxis by the researcher; disavowing what sociologist Norman Denzin terms a “crises
of representation.”37 By centering my research within the framework of feminist ethnography
and transnational feminist scholarship, I seek to avoid privileging my own perspective as both
researcher and observer (and a non-Muslim, non-Iranian individual), and attempt to engage in
self-reflexive praxis throughout the research process.38
Without fail, each one of the interview participants began our conversations with this
question: “Why are you interested in Iranian women?” Parastoo admits that she doesn’t trust
Westerners whose research has to do with Middle Eastern women, as a result of the arrogance
and cultural superiority that often underlines their research. She says, “To be honest, I don’t trust
33
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Westerners who study Middle Eastern women. I hate when they look down on us. I don’t feel
I’m less intelligent or less educated than them.” As a white, middle-class, European-American,
the problematic nature of this very inquiry and those whom I invite into these discussions has
from its very beginnings produced an uneasy feeling from within. Not unlike the tensions that I
have frequently encountered with women of color in our discussions of white privilege and
micro-racism within American academia and our local communities, the study of Iranian
women’s experiences brings with it all of the baggage of Western feminist scholarship in
researching the Middle Eastern “other.”39 The primary purpose of this project, in addition to
refuting inaccurate claims, is to invite a discussion of the chasm that persists within these
communities, and more broadly within contemporary Western and transnational feminist
scholarship.40
Recognizing my own privileged location, as well as the limitations of my own social
purview, has made this experience an incredibly awarding and fulfilling research endeavor. With
each interview, with each conversation, I hope to have provided open and honest discussions
with women who entrusted me with the knowledge of their stories and experiences. After
locating myself within the context of Western and transnational feminist understandings, as well
as within the context of our local community in Chicago, all participants expressed an interest in
contributing to the research project and telling me their stories.
The participants’ backgrounds vary considerably in terms of religion, ethnicity, and
social background. All are university students or recent graduates. Several are politically
conscious and some participated in the protests following the contested 2009 presidential
39
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elections in Iran, a period in recent Iranian history that marked the beginning of the country’s
Green Movement, a political and ideological movement comprised mostly of intellectuals,
students, women’s groups, and youth.41 Grounded in principles of “liberal democracy” and
“Islamic Secularism,” Iran’s Green Movement has its beginnings in the country’s 1990s reform
movement, a political undertaking aimed at reforming the country’s political and social structure,
in which civil rights, intellectual freedom and civic engagement prospered.42
Almost all participants have expressed a profound disappointment and shock at the
representation of Middle Eastern women in American media and mainstream culture. Many have
also experienced first-hand instances of narrow-mindedness and racism as a result of their status
as ‘Iranian’ and ‘Middle Eastern’ women in America. The enthusiasm with which these women
have approached our conversations demonstrates to me their conviction toward creating an
alternative narrative about Middle Easterners, Iranians, and Muslim women, which counter
mainstream hegemonic depictions. It is with this knowledge that I believe the significance of my
project may contribute, however modest in scope, to the advancement of alternative discourses
and a more critical, more thought provoking understanding of the potential for cohesion of
Western feminist scholarship with transnational feminist praxis.
Summary
I have approached this project with the knowledge that the participants who have so
generously shared their stories with me comprise just a small number of the Iranian diasporic
population in Chicago. While their narratives provide only a few perspectives on women’s
experiences in Iran and in America, I believe these provide insightful perspectives on individual
narratives of experience and agency. In Chapter 1 I introduce the interview participants, and
41
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provide an outline of the theoretical framework utilized in transnational feminist praxis and
feminist ethnography. In Chapter 2 I present a historical background of recent Iranian history as
well as a review of existing scholarship and literature on comparative feminist and cultural
studies. Chapter 3 incorporates a thematic analysis of the interviews and a discussion of the
results. Finally, in Chapter 4 I provide a conclusion to the study, a synthesis of the results, as
well as a look at opportunities for future research.
Chapter 1: Interview Participants and Theoretical Framework
An Introduction to the Interview Participants
Leela (a pseudonym) was born in Tehran, Iran’s capital city and main urban center, in
1980, one year after the Iranian Revolution, during a period of incredible social and political
transformation. Leela comes from a well-educated, upper middle-class family whose antirevolutionary sentiments continue to resonate with her today. Born to a physician father and a
social scientist mother, Leela recalls vivid memories of a childhood marked with the violence
of war, a strict religious education in her school, and the negative reaction of her family to the
newly founded Islamic State. Leela’s family is staunchly secular, as are most of her family’s
relatives and circle of friends. Her parents were against the Revolution and the Islamic State,
and in our conversation she recalls instances when her classmates were questioned about their
parents’ private lives in school. “The educational system was so tough [for] us,” she says, “that
is why I am telling you about this generation, the country was so damaged.”
Coming of age in the 1990s, Leela admits that at times she engaged in rebellious
behavior, but says that her generation in particular, those born during those crucial years during
and directly following the revolution were, despite the governmental limitations they faced, too
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“shocked, surprised, and tired to fight” because of a childhood surrounded by war and a strict,
religious environment. She says,
We are the lost generation…We are all tired, we are not like our age, we are older….I
myself think about my wishes, they are not great anymore...I don’t think about anything
special in the future anymore…because all of those cravings, expectations, they were all
ruined, so there’s no energy left to think about great ideals, great goals. The only thing
that I do wish every minute is that my country becomes a stable one, you know? There
[are] no more wishes for me and so many people in my generation.
Leela, like most of her friends, is politically conscious and aware, and closely follows the
happenings in her home country. Having immigrated to the United States with her husband just
over six months ago, she feels an incredible homesickness and pull to her country. Her
acceptance to a master’s program in Art History at a local university in Chicago has given her
something to look forward to for the future, even though she is uncertain whether will return to
her home country. Leela is an avid human rights supporter and participated in the protests
following the 2009 presidential elections. She follows Iranian news daily because she says,
“…we were born at the beginning of this revolution, we follow this system, as if we are
following our destiny, because it’s our life. We are like two partners, we love and hate each
other, we [follow] to see what will happen…”
Like Leela, Parastoo, a 27-year-old educated middle class woman from northern Iran, is
deeply devoted to her country’s future, and is an avid supporter of the Green Movement. She
follows Iranian news and is an engineering student at a local Chicago university. Although
Parastoo comes from a highly religious family, she has in recent years turned away from
religion. After coming to Chicago with her husband three years ago, Parastoo admits that she
has changed since she first arrived in the United States. Her initial experiences with non-Iranian
Americans and with other Iranians in the Diaspora were shockingly disappointing, and her
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recollections of her first years in America are marked by intense sadness and loneliness. Upon
her initial arrival in Chicago, Parastoo encountered intense competition with other Iranian
women, a fact she now attributes to their internal loneliness and desire for social status in a
foreign community. Parastoo was especially impacted by the negative perception of Iranian
women by other Americans and Western media. In our conversation she recalls her initial
impressions,
Here [Americans] have no idea [about you], you’re just a foreigner, nothing, and the
worst part [is] you’re an Iranian foreigner, you’re dangerous. It’s really difficult. And I
noticed that people are not even eager to know you, they don’t even ask questions about
your country…Every time I heard the name of Iran [in the media] it was related to the
atomic bomb….it’s because of your media! Every time I heard the name of Iran it was
kind of related to the atomic bomb!
It was only until the 2009 Iranian presidential elections that Parastoo felt compassion and
empathy from other Americans she encountered. Parastoo has developed her own sense of
community by forging new friendships with diverse people, most of whom are not from Iran.
Since her arrival in Chicago three years ago, Parastoo has found new perspective on the Iranian
diasporic community, and prefers to maintain relationships with them, for the most part, at a
distance. Although she is homesick for her family, she is still unsure whether she and her
husband will go back to Iran one day.
Negar, a 27-year-old MBA student, came to Chicago four years ago from Tehran, Iran’s
capital and main urban center. Both of her parents work in the medical industry, her father as a
doctor and her mother as a midwife. Having initially studied engineering as an undergraduate
and master’s student, Negar has recently decided to pursue an alternate career path in business
and finance. Like Leela, Negar’s family is middle class, but is neither religious nor secular. She
emphasizes that her parents allowed her and her sister to dictate their own values about
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religiosity and comportment, as a way to encourage self-determination, autonomy, and
confidence.
Negar believes that women’s employment and financial opportunities are far greater in
America than in Iran, and that sexual double standards do not exist as blatantly here as they do
in her home country. She attributes this to the State-imposed limitations placed on women,
particularly in the workplace where, she argues, women are judged according to the type of
hejab they wear. Although Negar admits that sexual double standards exist in both places, she
feels that women encounter greater instances of sexual harassment in daily public life in her
home country. There, if a woman speaks out against perpetrators, she says, it is perceived as
“…your fault.” She argues that people believe, “…you shouldn’t act like that, you shouldn’t
wear [this], they relate everything to your appearance or your makeup, that you use to seduce
[men]…If you say something back, the public thinks that you did something wrong, not him.
You cannot call the police, because the police will not come for this kind of stuff.” Negar
further contends, however, that younger women are increasingly engaging in resistive behavior,
and speak out against such grievances. Since she came to America, Negar says that, “…here, I
am considered a human first, not a woman first, but in Iran…I’m considered a sex object.”
Asal is a 27-year-old graduate student of micro-biology at a local Chicago university.
Asal grew up in Tehran in a small Armenian community, a population group which comprises
less than 1% of the country’s 70 million inhabitants.43 Although most Armenians immigrated to
Iran in the 17th century, Asal’s family has resided in Iran since the 1800s, and she admits that
her identity is interwoven with both Iranian and Armenian culture and tradition. Her family is
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passionately nationalistic and holds onto the Armenian identity through their language, culture,
schooling, and church community.44 Although her family is not religious, Asal says that her
family does not approve of her relationship with her fiancé, an Iranian Muslim, because he is
not Armenian. For Asal this is especially difficult, and she admits that this has caused
significant tension with them in recent months. Asal refused to convert to Islam, and at one
point her fiancé considered conversion to her Orthodox Christian faith. In Iran, it is illegal for a
Muslim to renounce his/her religion.45 While it is legal for a Muslim man to marry a nonMuslim woman (so long as she adheres to any of the three Abrahamic religions—Christianity,
Judaism, or Islam), marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man is forbidden.46
As a result of these circumstances, Asal and her fiancé came to Chicago in order to live
together and pursue their respective educations. While her fiancé was able to secure a student
visa, Asal came to America as a social refugee because of her religious and ethnic minority
status in Iran.47
Asal does not believe the hejab prevents men from looking at women. In a moment of
frustration, Asal relays the following sentiment:
[In Iran] you will find lots of those men who are looking at you in some way that’s like,
oh, he’s having a fantasy in his head. So if that person wants to imagine something or
look in a like, dirty way, he can do that even if you are under a blanket. But if someone
44
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really doesn’t want to look at you that way, he won’t do that even if you are naked. So,
by just hiding some hair, are you kidding me? What is this? It’s not important that you
should put it under the scarf. And doing that made our new generation more greedy to
[see] what is under [the veil].
Although Asal believes that women experience greater everyday freedoms in America (such as
engaging in public sports), she also notes that the field of micro-biology is just as maledominant in America as it is in Iran and that salary differences favor men above women.
Asal also feels that while instances of sexual harassment are far less frequent in America,
the sexual objectification of women’s bodies is by and large more pressing in Western culture
and that the visual culture “is so much stronger here.” On a recent trip to Las Vegas with her
fiancé, she admits that, “It was kind of, like, really sad to see all those girls there, like, the
waitress who is barely wearing anything…” Women who put their bodies on display, Asal
claims, objectify their bodies and are in turn objectified by those who are watching them;
something that Asal believes is much more prevalent in the West.
Iranban, a 32-year-old Iranian woman, came to the United States four years ago with her
husband, both in pursuit of graduate education. Like the other participants, Iranban grew up in
Tehran in an upper-middle class neighborhood with her parents and sister. Her father is a
religious man, but her mother, she says, is less so. Unlike their cousin, who entered an arranged
marriage at the age of fifteen, Iranban and her sister were raised to make their own choices and
to be autonomous. She says, “Always my father and mother give this independence, this
freedom to me. You should know what you are doing, so we cannot plan your life, they would
say.” Like Leela, Iranban’s earliest childhood memories are marred by recollections of war.
During their first years in school, Leela says that jokes and games were used as a way to resist
and make light of the strict environment in school, where religious leaders frequently
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questioned them about their parents’ lives. Iranban exclaims, “It was resistance, of course it
was,” when she speaks about the practical jokes they played on their religious teachers. Leela
states,
In Iran we made fun out of many things that the government wanted us to practice in a
serious way, but we made fun out of it, and we continue to do that [today]. And now
there are some comic series about religion on the internet, whenever I see them I wonder
how these people and nation can make fun out of everything. Make fun out of religion,
rules and regulation.
Today, Iranban agrees that Iranian women “are trying their best in Iran” to improve women’s
social position in society. As a secular individual, Iranban, like Leela and Parastoo, does not
believe that veiling is an effective deterrent against sexual harassment and the sexual
objectification of women’s bodies in Iran. However, she also believes that women in America
encounter greater obstacles. Social expectations, such as marriage, financial success, and
motherhood continuously limit American women, Iranban argues.
I think women here just think they have their freedom. Sometimes I just look at the way
that men look at them….they’re just thinking she’s beautiful, that is enough. Do you
know what I mean? If she earns good money, it is enough. That is the thing that is so
surprising for me, the freedom that I was thinking about the United States, for the women
especially, is not as rich as I think.
Each participant’s narrative, while unique in historical context and individual experience,
provides a more cohesive and comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and complexities of
Iranian women’s lives as Middle Eastern immigrants living in the American diaspora. While
most admit that women in America enjoy a greater number of ‘ordinary’ citizen rights, based on
their own observations many believe that Western women face greater challenges in a culture
that promotes female hyper-sexuality and the sexual objectification of women’s bodies.
Furthermore, many of their experiences in America have unfortunately been overshadowed by
their perceived status as ‘Middle Easterners’ and ‘foreigners,’ which have caused significant
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feelings of depression and self-induced isolation. Despite the social obstacles they face in Iran,
each woman has made it explicitly clear that Iranian women engage in intentional acts of daily
resistance and that despite their social limitations, they possess an unyielding fortitude as
conscious agents of social change.
Utilizing a Transnational Feminist Framework in my Methodology and Praxis
Transnational feminist theory demands a reframing of traditional, Western feminism into
a more introspective and multilayered framework of feminist theory and praxis.48 Considering all
individuals’ perspectives from a multitude of intersecting positionalities requires intentional
collaboration with differing feminists, activists, and social justice groups across the globe. It is a
way of thinking anew about the world, which encourages an alternative framework for
addressing contemporary issues of social inequality, gender difference, and an acute awareness
of the global politics of our time.49 Grounded within a post-colonial, post-modern critique of
Western feminist theory, this theory advocates alternative viewpoints outside of the parameters
of dominant hegemonies.50
Utilizing Inderpral Grewal’s term, “scattered hegemonies” as a way to contextualize the
subjectivities that exist outside of a Euro-centric/American-centric perspective is essential to
adopting an effective transnational feminist framework.51 Its theoretical underpinnings encourage
a more critical look at the universal category of gender and the politics of “global feminism” by
considering the impact of global economies, “patriarchal nationalisms,” and other various forms
of local oppression on women’s lives and personal experiences.52 Transnational feminist theory
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and praxis also challenges traditional ways of knowing—“the production, publication,
distribution, and consumption of information and ideas”—in Western feminist scholarship,
which as Chandra Mohanty argues, must be confronted in order to disrupt homogenous images
of a Third World women as victimized, tradition-bound, and passive.53 The significance of
utilizing a transnational feminist framework in this research project cannot be overstated. In an
effort to create an effective and intentional counter-narrative about Iranian women in the United
States, it is imperative that I engage transnational feminist theory with praxis throughout the
research phase.
Reclaiming the Narrative
Given the suppositions made about Muslim and Middle Eastern women in mainstream
American media, it is especially important that my perspectives (as a Western
researcher/observer) are not privileged throughout the interview process. As a qualitative method
of research and information gathering, ethnography has been critically examined by early
feminist anthropologists who considered the problematic components of this research method
and ultimately, the implications of its findings.54 Most often, feminist critics concerned
themselves with issues of power and knowledge, ethics of research, the dilemmas of profit, and
professionalism.55 As one scholar notes, “Ethnography’s distinctive research method...privileges
the body as a site of knowing…”56 While ethnography offers detailed descriptions of the daily
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life through a ‘writing of culture,’ feminist ethnography challenges traditional scientific
paradigms of knowledge and “truth.”57
Feminist Ethnographic Praxis
I turn now to developing a critical understanding of feminist ethnographic praxis as an
integral component of the research process. This type of praxis insists upon the inclusion of
interview participants in each phase of the interview process.58 It encourages a more cohesive,
collaborative effort between the researcher and those being researched. By working in tandem,
questions of authority and power, and for “whom” one might be speaking are critically assessed.
Katherine Borland suggests that, “By extending the conversation we initiate while collecting oral
narratives to the later stage of interpretation, we might more sensitively negotiate issues of
interpretive authority in our research.”59 This practice, Borland further argues, would at the very
least bring to the fore those points at which the researcher and interview participant fail to
agree.60
Judith Stacy argues too, that elements of “inequality, exploitation, and even betrayal are
endemic to ethnography.”61 She insists that despite an ethnographer’s greatest efforts to
incorporate the perspectives and “voice” of the interview participants, a published ethnography
represents “an intervention into the lives” of research participants and represents ultimately the
final product of the ethnographer alone.62 The consequences of which, according to Stacey,
should include challenges of interpretation, evaluation, and judgment by those being
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researched.63 The solutions proposed by Stacey include identifying the limitations of the
ethnographic process as an imbalanced relationship between the observer and the participant as
well as a “self-conscious awareness about the distortions and limitations of the textual
productions of [researchers’] studies.”64 Recognizing my own interpretation of the participants’
experiences as only a “partial truth” of their stories has aided me in the interpretive writing
process.
While feminist ethnography encourages an awareness of the power dynamics in the
creation of partial ‘truths’ in the research process, it is equally as important to critically engage
the conversation between those being ‘researched’ and the ‘researcher.’ In other words,
challenging underlying assumptions and engaging the participants through conversation is an
essential component to writing an ethnography that both forges new ideas and questions the
status quo. Here, follow-up questions and dialogue have encouraged this kind of reciprocity, one
which considers both the perspectives of the researcher and the individual participants of the
research process.
For example, in one conversation I had with an individual she accepted the idealization of
women’s bodies in America, particularly in terms of their physical attributes, without looking at
how women’s bodies were subjugated and objectified throughout this process. By not
acknowledging, say, the effects of female hyper-sexuality in the media on young, adolescent
women, this particular individual accepted societal expectations of Western female sexuality at
face value, without questioning whose interest they ultimately serve. Here, issues of agency, selfdetermination, and resistance to misogyny were not central to her narrative. As a researcher, I
felt it was important to address and engage what I perceived as an unintentional oversight,
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particularly as it related to issues of agency and self-determination for young, Western women. I
use opportunities like these as a way to engage questions of power and assumptions with the
participants in order to invoke dialogue and create a more complex, nuanced analysis of their
experiences and perspectives. Still, I have worked in cooperation with the participants to ensure
that the flow of information, the construction of identities, self, and subjectivities, continues to be
empowered from both directions throughout the interpretive phase and writing stage.65 By
situating more of the perspectives “of the researched” central to the writing process, as I hope to
have accomplished throughout this process, potential violations of interpretation are significantly
diminished.66
Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Study and Review of the Literature
The following pages offer a brief synthesis publications related to feminist movement(s)i,
revolutionary discoursesii, youth culture, social movements in Iraniii, as well as Diaspora
communities that address issues of gender and sexuality. In addition to transnational feminist
scholarship (which is examined more closely in Chapter 3), the theoretical underpinnings of my
project include theories of power and knowledge, subjectivity, and dominant discourses. Among
others, both Michel Foucault and Judith Butler’s theories of gender and subjectivity also inform
my research inquiry.
A Brief Overview of Women’s History in Pre-Revolutionary Iran
The 2009 Green Movement has prompted a renewed global interest in the decades-long
struggle for women’s right in Iran. Women’s political and social activism has a far reaching
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history in the country, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century.67 Their political, economic, and
social contributions leading up to and during the 1979 Revolution were especially significant, as
part of the Shah’s expansive modernization program, with increasing numbers of women
enrolled in higher education and universities, as well as in the employment sector.68 In the early
1960s women also worked diligently to bring about status law changes in areas of divorce,
marriage, child custody laws, and voting rights.69
By the 1970s women comprised approximately 43% of teachers, 44% of clerical workers,
and 11% of medical and paramedical personnel, although these were largely limited to a small
number of elite Iranian women.70 The majority of Iranians in rural areas remained illiterate due
to the Shah’s limited expansion of educational services, although this increased by nearly 45%
from the 8% literacy rate measured just several decades prior, in the mid-1950s.71 Rural women
remained largely uneducated and illiterate due to their own familial and labor obligations and as
a result of the social stigma associated with female education. By the 1970s, however, more and
more rural women gained access to the country’s nationalized education system, and the
percentage of women with higher education degrees jumped from 1% of the country’s
population in the 1960s to 5% just ten years later.72 Urban literacy rates grew in substantial
numbers during this period, jumping by 33% in the mid-1950s to 65% in the mid-1970s. And by
the end of the 1970s, nearly one-third of the country’s 175,000 university students were women,
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and comprised nearly 20% of the country’s urban labor force.73 While there were tremendous
educational benefits for Iran’s population, the Shah’s modernization program, which was largely
structured around the rapid industrialization of Iran and the White Revolution (a land reform
aimed at restoring land ownership to Iran’s rural farmers), resulted in detrimental consequences
for Iran’s working and low-income populations.74 High rates of urban poverty, increased income
disparity between the growing number of urban poor and the middle- and upper-classes, as well
as an increasingly repressive secular monarchy spurred many women to join various opposition
movements, including religious and Marxists organizations, whose disdain for the Westernized
sexual objectification of Iranian women allied them even further against the monarchy.75
Those who aligned themselves with Islamic modernism, a movement that called for the
“reform and revitalization” of Shi’a Islam, were supporters of an Islamic religious platform
“based on a general concept of social justice” embedded within this religious doctrine.76 Others
sought allegiance within Marxist and Leftist secular organizations, and equally scorned the
hyper-sexualized presentation of Iranian women in Western-backed commercialism, cinema, and
in the media.77 Leading up to and during the revolutionary period, women actively engaged in
political protests, student-led movements, and led political demonstrations, protests, and student
movements against the increasingly corrupt monarchy.78
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Despite their involvement in the populist uprising, the decades since the Revolution have
witnessed a substantial regression in their legal and social status in Iranian society, as well as a
reversal of most laws enacted in favor of gender equity under the monarchy79. Newly Stateimposed legal restrictions putting women at distinct disadvantage in divorce and marriage rights,
child custody laws, citizenship rights, obligatory veiling, and limitations on the freedom of
mobility are the most frequent subjects of controversy surrounding the contemporary women’s
debate in Iran.80 For the past three decades both secular and religious women’s groups have
lobbied against the abrogation of gender equity laws, which existed prior to 1979, as well as
against new laws and policies that further repress women’s autonomy, economic independence,
and access to fair legal protection.81
Building a Nation: Women as Producers
Since the toppling of the Qajar Dynasty in the early twentieth century women’s gender
identity has been a central theme in the country’s national-building project.82 Each phase has
incorporated varying threads of gender discourse that hinge women’s emancipation on the
physical representation of their bodies, sexuality, and their role as wives, mothers, and as
symbols of the nation.83 Author Parvin Paidar, among others, has worked extensively on the
subject of women’s gender identity in twentieth century Iran. She concludes, “[Iranian] women
are, on the one hand, constructed like men as citizens. But they are also treated as a special
category in relation to various roles they play in society. These include reproductive and
79
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symbolic ones. Women are assigned status as mothers and revered as symbols of national and
communal identity.”84 Throughout each phase of Iran’s nation-state building process, gender
discourse has been embedded with socially inscribed expectations of femininity and womanhood
that were linked to the country’s progress toward modernization and international sovereignty.85
Scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis have examined the theoretical underpinnings of the
relationship between gender and nation-building projects in modern history. She argues that
nation-building projects rely on women as ‘natural’ producers of a “collective identity” and a
“common origin,” which in turn, has had significant effects on women’s social positions in the
formation of the modern nation-state.86 According to German historian Peter Alter, nationalism
is defined as “both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and sovereign
nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manages to mobilize the political will of
people or a large section of the population.”87 Both Alter and Yuval-Davis argue that ideologies
of gender within nation-building projects are based on the idea that identity is a socially
constructed entity within a specific culture or population of a nation-state.88 In her analysis
Yuval-Davis further suggests that women’s biological ability to produce and bear children is
inextricably tied to nationalist symbolism as ‘reproducers’ of the nation.89 Women’s identities
are inextricably linked to their role as mothers and wives, and the future and stability of the
nation-state therefore, is conjoined with its subsequent strength and growth.90 The notion of
‘culture’ or of a ‘culturalized discourse,’ based on Yuval-Davis’ assessment, places gender
central to nationalist discourse and nation-building projects. Here she comments, “In this
84
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culturalized discourse, gendered bodies and sexuality play pivotal roles as territories, markers
and reproducers of the narratives of nations and other collectives.”91
Other scholars like Partha Chatterjee, Leila Ahmed, and Lila Abu-Lughod have also
examined gender and cultural identity as they relate to twentieth century nation-building
projects. Chatterjee has focused much of his work on the construction of Indian and Bengali
identities, with a specific emphasis on the ‘inner/outer dichotomy’ of the post-colonial Indian
nationalist project. Chatterjee argues that during the twentieth century the ‘material’ and
‘spiritual’ domains of Indian life were based on what he coins ‘selective ideology,’ where the
technological advances of the West were accepted into Indian life as modernizing advances, but
the religious and spiritual ‘inner’ qualities of life were firmly preserved within the
conceptualization of gender identity and knowledge.92
Similarly, Leila Ahmed describes the discourse of Western colonial “feminism”93 and
cultural nationalism as a “vexed relationship,” in which the question of women’s social position
“…animates the political and ideological contests couched in the language of cultural
authenticity versus foreign influence.”94 Lila Abu-Lughod’s exploration into the “woman
question” also exposes the competing discourses of Egyptian nationalism with Western colonial
influence. In particular, the reemergence of the veil as a symbol of resistance and rejection of the
91
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West reaffirms what Ahmed and Chatterjee similarly argue: that the issues of women—their
sexuality and physical presentation—tend to be linked within the anti-colonial nationalist
discourse with struggles over cultural integrity and nationalist identity.95 For example, during the
period of British colonial rule in Egypt during the 19th and early 20th centuries, middle- and
upper-class Egyptian women largely embraced Western ideals of femininity and womanhood
through dress, lifestyle, intellectual development, and political and social participation. Aside
from increased involvement (particularly for the middle-upper and upper-classes) in Western
style education, and Western secular political and social organizations, unveiling was one of the
most noticeable ways that Egyptian women renounced ‘backward’ ways of indigenous life and
embraced Western style of dress and the mores of the British Victorian ideal.96 Leila Ahmed
writes, “Veiling—to Western eyes, the most visible marker of the differentness and inferiority of
Islamic societies—became the symbol now of both the oppression of women (or, in the language
of the day, Islam’s degradation of women) and the backwardness of Islam, as it became the open
target of colonial attack and the spearhead of the assault on Muslim societies.”97
Just fifty short years later, during the 1970s, a period of intense resurgence in Islamist
movements in Egypt and across the Middle East, brought with it a return to “authentic” and
“traditional” Islamic way of life, where veiling and religious social mores were widely
encouraged and accepted by many middle-class people in Cairo’s urban communities. A“return”
to an “authentic” Arab culture, which addressed issues of dress, dynamics of family, and mixedsex relationships and interactions in public spaces, reaffirmed the strength of the Islamist
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position and simultaneously denounced the West and the “discourse of colonialism.”98 Here
Ahmed argues,
The Islamist position regarding women is also problematic in that, essentially reductive
in nature, it traps the issue of women with the struggle over culture—just as the initiating
colonial discourse had done. Typically, women—and the reaffirmation of indigenous
customs relating to women and the restoration of the customs and laws of past Islamic
societies with respect to women—are the centerpiece of the agenda of political
Islamists.99
The practical implications of this kind of cultural transformation from colonial rule to one
of Islamic “authenticity” on women’s lives involved redefining ideals of femininity, and
womanhood, as well as their social status and legal rights,100 vis-à-vis nationalist/religious
Egyptian discourse. After Egypt was decolonized by a nationalist revolt in 1922, Egypt was ruled
by an autocratic secular government until the 1970s, where after it witnessed a resurgence in
Islamic nationalist movements. During the fifty year span between the 1920s and the 1970s,
Egypt’s leadership maintained a platform of Arab secular nationalism, for which President
Gamal Abdel Nasser was most notably known.101 The resurgence in Islamic movements, which
ensued after the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967, brought with it a religious awakening through
which the future of Egypt’s modernization could be addressed and legitimized.102 Women’s
unveiling and subsequent re-veiling, therefore, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, even if
98

Ibid., 237.
Ibid., 236.
100
Although the acceptance of the Islamist movement in Egypt represented a return to a culturally “authentic” way
of life, there has been significant contestation by Islamist feminists like Leila Ahmed who argue that the discourse of
Islam embraces a static notion of gender based on centuries-old interpretations of “womanhood” as something that is
both “unambiguous” and “ascertainable in some precise and absolute sense.” This idea, that Islam embraces the
continual legal and social subjugation of women as supported by most modern-day political Islamist governments, is
as Leila Ahmed argues, where these very political movements have in fact failed. She writes, “It is this technical,
legalistic establishment version of Islam, a version that largely bypasses the ethical elements in the Islamic message,
that continues to be politically powerful today…..Thus, the Islamist position with respect to the distant past is
flawed in assuming that the meaning of gender informing the first Islamic society is reducible to a single, simple,
unconflicted meaning that is ascertainable in some precise and absolute sense…” Ibid., 239.
101
James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc., 2002), 25.
102
Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State 3rd Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
Inc., 1997), x.
99

- 34 -

voluntary, became interlaced with nationalist and religious ideologies that represented the
cultural “authenticity” of Islam and Arabic life. Here again, we see how inseparable the
relationship is between nationalist ideologies and women’s socially constructed identity.
Contemporary Iranian history has also undergone similar nationalist paradigms,
throughout which national identity is subsumed with symbolic and material gender codes. Prior
to the 1979 Revolution, this was perhaps most epitomized through the ‘Women’s Awakening
Project (1936-1941), a government-mandated platform initiated by Reza Shah Pahlavi, which
promoted the education and integration of women into the workforce, and which also outlawed
veiling.103 The representation of women’s bodies through the forced adaptation of Western dress
and beauty standards became central to the nationalist gender ideologies present during this time.
Women’s bodies, as in Egypt and in India, were made subjects of the State and of Western
influence, where struggles over national and cultural identity came to the fore.104
Similarly, studies on the conceptualization of women’s identity in post-socialist Poland
and the surrounding Eastern European region also indicate comparable patterns of gender
suffused with nationalist ideals and symbolic, religious connotations.105 The ideological
structures in place prior to the collapse of communism and socialism in Poland specifically have,
to a large degree, impacted the social expectations for women since the end of the Cold War.
103
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Specific religious ideologies (such as sexual purity, motherhood, and guardians of the nation)
have affected the role of women in both public and private spaces, and have acted as filters for
the most prevalent Polish femininities found today.106
For example, after the end of the Cold War, the Catholic Church emerged as one of the
strongest and most influential religious and political organizations in Polish society. Since then,
women’s reproductive rights have been significantly c1urtailed and abortion outlawed. Within
the Church itself, women are idealized as domestic caregivers and nurturers of the family.107
Despite the increasing numbers of female university graduates and growing participation in the
professional workforce, the Catholic Church has appropriated many of the ‘traditional,’
patriarchal structures already in place and valorized women as the cornerstones of family and
nation. The portrayal of Maryja, the Virgin Mary, for example, as a symbol of religious purity
and Polish nationalism reinforces the notion of ‘gender adoration’ through the collective national
struggle and sacrifice of women—or ‘Mother Poles—as the protectors and emblems of Polish
national unity.108 As one author suggests, “What emerged from the Quiet Revolution of 1989 in
Poland was a highly traditional culture, rooted in religious fundamentalism, nationalist ideology,
and patriarchal practices.”109
Other examples include the construction of the ‘ideal’ middle-class English woman
during the Victorian period in the mid-19th century as well as the American woman during the
post-World War II period during the 1940s and 50s. During the Victorian period, English
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nationalist identity was embedded with ideals and values that emulated women’s domesticity, as
well as their functionality as dutiful wives, mothers, and daughters within the home. 110 Victorian
ideologies were constructed based on the idea that a woman’s “habitus took the form of a useful,
productive [white] body…” within the realm of the private, domestic sphere.111 Similarly, postWorld War II American nationalist ideologies were centered on the ideals of women’s
subservience and sexual virtue. Like women during the Victorian period, American women’s
gendered identities during the late 1940s and 50s were positioned within the realm of domesticity
and male dependence.112 In each of these instances, gender is the site upon which nationalist
ideologies materialize. Women as bearers of ‘cultural authenticity,’ whether as biological
producers of a ‘collective origin,’ or as upholders of family, morality, and the private space, are
the corners stones of nation-building projects, and those that ultimately sustain its collective
nationalist identity
Drawing comparisons with other societies in transition enables a more critical
understanding of the linkages of gender identity with nationalist and religious discourse. Thus,
the connection between the nation and women is established; as producers and educators of
children and as bearers of tradition and culture.113 Indeed, the struggle over women’s gender
identity in Iran has not only been a battle between ‘traditionalism’ and modernity114, but also a
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battle between Western influence, religion, and Iranian sovereignty, where a woman’s social
experiences and practices have embodied these very contradictions. Thus, much of the struggle
of a contemporary Iranian youth identity is as much embedded in these historical battles as they
are a result of the social contradictions of post-revolutionary and post-Islamic Iranian society.115
The Creation of the Islamic Republic and Women’s Gender Identity
In 1980, shortly after the populist uprising of the Iranian Revolution had toppled the
monarchy, religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini conveyed his pride for the women of Iran
because of their massive participation in the Iranian Revolution. In the years leading up to and
during the Revolution, women from all political leanings staged massive protests, became
involved in political organizations, and engaged in political activist groups. Their participation
was most prevalent during the two years directly following the revolution, a period labeled the
“Spring of Freedom,” because of the relative political freedom enjoyed by various groups
including Leftists, Marxists, Islamists, labor groups and women’s organizations.116 The millions
of women who opposed the Shah were heavily involved in the revolution, and as author Nayereh
Tohidi argues, this was for some with more traditional backgrounds the first opportunities of
active political engagement outside of the home.117 This was not the case for many universityeducated, middle-class women, who, although initially supportive of Khomeini’s promises of
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reform, grew increasingly suspicious of the clerical leaders that promoted Islamic law as the
future governing system of Iran. Nevertheless, according to Tohidi’s analysis, women from all
social and political leanings—some secular and others very religious—came together in rallies
and demonstrations against during the revolutionary movement.118 In fact, secular, universityeducated, and leftist women who prior to the revolution did not wear the hejab chose to don it
out of solidarity with the religious movement. Tohidi writes, “Many university-educated, middleclass and leftist women, who may not have worn the veil before or usually would have seen it as
nonprogressive, considered it a minor concession for the sake of unity against the common
enemy.”119
The driving force behind the revolutionary movement, according to Asef Bayat, grew out
of the increasing dissatisfaction with the Shah’s autocratic rule by the majority of the country’s
population. While those benefiting from his modernization policies included much of the middleand upper-classes, his repressive policies on equilateral political engagement frustrated the
masses, including the working-class, modernized youth, and the Islamic clergy.120 Bayat further
argues that although each of these parties experienced dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement
from the State for various reasons, they collectively united against the Shah as a symbol of antiWestern, anti-Imperialist beliefs.121 He writes,
During the tense years of the 1970s, therefore, at the height of the Shah’s authoritarian
rule and during a period of remarkable economic growth, many people (except perhaps
the upper class and the landed peasantry) seemed dissatisfied, albeit for different reasons.
But all were united in blaming the Shah and his Western allies, especially the U.S., for
that state of affairs. It is therefore not surprising that the language of dissent and protest
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was largely antimonarchy, anti-imperialist, Third Worldist, and even nationalist, turning
in the end into a religious discourse.122
Thus it is clear, that while much of the scholarship on the Iranian revolution focuses on religious
revivalism, the underlying reasons for the populist uprising were varied, and included opposition
against the growing class-based inequalities, the monarchy’s emphasis on consumerist policies,
and the increasing marginalization of groups that attempted to reclaim political agency.
Many women, largely inspired by the works of Islamic intellectual Ali Shariati, opposed
the Shah for promoting what Sadeghi argues was a highly sexualized femininity.123 She writes,
Following the encouragement of Ayatollah Khomein, huge numbers of women actively
participated in the street protests. They felt at the time their presence was needed for
over-throwing the corrupt Pahlavi regime (1941-1979), which was trying to make women
depoliticized “western dolls,” (arusak Farangi), as the contemporary Islamist intellectual
Ali Shari’ati described.124
Thus, while it is clear that many women from all walks of life, including those from differing
classes, religious backgrounds, and political leanings, maintained markedly different positions on
the future of Iran’s governing system, as Tohidi, Bayat, and Sadeghi suggest, there was relative
collective allegiance against the Shah’s rule. Universally, there was a trend toward dis-engaging
women’s sexuality and sexual appeal as the cornerstone of women’s femininity. As in Iran,
across the West, feminists protested the continual depiction of women in the media and in
television in purely sexual terms. Encouraging an identity grounded in political and social
agency, rather than a sexualized femininity, was a common theme during much of the West’s
Second-wave feminist movements during the 1960s and into the 70s. The politics of public
appearance, where bodies become politicized, are the most prevalent issues that contemporary
122
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Western feminists, like many Iranian female activists during that time, included in their political
agendas.
Not unlike Chatterjee’s analysis of gender identity in post-colonial India and Bengal,
women’s gender identity became interwoven with Iran’s revolutionary discourse based on the
idea that Iranian women were the bearers of cultural authenticity and Iranian purity.125
Disavowing association with the Shah and Western values, the symbol of “woman” in the
Iranian State came to represent the reclamation of Islamic heritage and the “purification” of a
society.126 “The ‘purification’ of society,” as Sedghi writes, “through the control of women
meant that women’s movements and their labor for the nation, the revolution, and themselves
would serve not women’s own interest but the interest of patriarchy, as envisioned in this
revolutionary period by male-dominated participants…”127 The veiled woman came to represent
the country’s return to an ‘authentic’ Islam and its disassociation with Western cultural
imperialism and “Westoxification.”128 In a speech issued by Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after
the revolution, he declares the following, “Any nation that has women like the Iranian women
will surely be victorious.”129 His promises for “real freedom, equality, and dignity” were framed
within the guise of an ‘authentic’ Islamic discourse grounded on principals of social justice and
women’s subsequent emancipation.130
Within weeks of claiming political power, religious leaders instituted an ‘Islamic’
standard of dress, which included the re-veiling of Iranian women, the abrogation of the 1967
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Family Protection Law (which afforded women the right to divorce and child custody, and
increased the marriage age from nine to eighteen), and the prohibition of women’s judicial
participation.131 Despite their massive participation in the revolutionary uprising, including
thousands who protested on International Women’s Day in opposition to the legal enforcement
of the veil as well as the legal restrictions set in place; women have experienced significant
regression in the area of legal and social equality since the revolution.132
The discourse of rapid Islamisation ensured not only religious leaders’ political power,
but it also redefined the concept of modernity for Iran. While the conventional discourse of
modernity celebrated Western secular values as standards for national progress and sovereignty,
the process of Islamisation relied on the creation of a “modern Muslim nation” as the route to
national independence.133 The establishment of the guardianship of the jurist, or vilayat-ifaqih,
was the governing principal based on the absolute rule by the highest ranking religious leader of
that time, Ayatollah Khomeini.134 As one author argues Islamic polity “…promises to restore a
pure and unbroken order to modern society based on a claim to an ontologically legitimized
higher truth and a uniform set of values grounded in this truth.”135
With the national introduction of Shari’a, or Islamic Law, religious leaders attempted to
ensure that the religious doctrine permeated every aspect of Iranian life and reforms in areas such
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as the legislative structure, education, and physical appearance, were effectively put in place.136
Asef Bayat argues that, “In short, Islamism was in general based on a reading of Islam that
interpreted it as a complete social, political, and economic, and moral system that had answers to
all human problems.”137 As Bayat relays, the absolute authority of political-Islam as an infallible
doctrine left no part of society untouched by the new religious rule. An official ‘Islamic State’
like Iran mandates a social and political infrastructure determined by Islamic doctrine alone, in
which the “Qu’ran or Shari’a [Law] is the primary (or exclusive) source of all legislation in the
country, and the nature and form of the governmental system is derived from Islam.”138 Thus,
with the introduction of an Islamic State in early 1980, political religious leaders sought to
ensure that every aspect of political and social life in Iran stood in accordance with their
interpretation of Islamic Law.
Creating a new Islamic discourse included altering women’s gender identity. New laws
were passed that significantly curtailed freedoms on women’s dress, including compulsory
veiling. While religious women were not nearly as impacted, secular women (and those who
chose not to veil prior to the revolution) were significantly impacted by this new law. The
symbolic meaning of the representation women’s bodies, thus, took on specific religious and
nationalist meaning according to the new Islamic doctrine, and mandatory veiling was heavily
enforced. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, women’s roles as wives and mothers were meant
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to be emulated within a religious framework “…to produce manpower for the war, for the glory
of Islam, and for the nation.”139
Cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall talks about the interconnected relationship between
language, representation, and meaning in what has been called a “circuit of culture,” a cyclical
relationship between regulation, representation, consumption, and identity.140 As a
‘representational system,’ language is comprised of signs and symbols (whether in the form of
words, images, objects, clothing, etc.) and is used to represent and convey specific ideas and
ideologies in any given time period in history. Representation, therefore, through language
(whether in symbolic or written form) is “central to the processes by which meaning is
produced.”141
In the same way that Nira Yuval-Davis hinges nation-building projects on women’s
‘collective identities’ as mothers and producers of a nation, the meaning and representation of
Iranian women’s gendered identities in post-revolutionary Iran were similarly embedded within
these reproductive codes (as wives and mothers). Gender and sexuality in Iran became
intertwined with nationalist and religious paradigms, as Hamideh Sedghi argues, and control
over women’s sexuality is one way that revolutionary discourse was preserved.142 Mounira M.
Charrad writes, “In the Middle East as elsewhere, women’s bodies become the site of discourses
on nation building and patriotic duty when issues of fertility and reproduction are openly
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politicized.”143 Nationalist and religious discourse had, as in other countries such as Egypt, India,
and later Poland, become gendered in its conceptualization. The representation of women’s
bodies in public spaces, through veiling for example, as well as their roles as mothers and wives
(as nurturers of the family) became symbolic of the ‘ideal’ Iranian women.
Post-Revolutionary Iran: Civic Organizing and Women’s Resistance
The significance of the generation born during and in the years following the revolution
is marked by their historical location in Iran’s modern history and the strategies of resistance
they have enacted against the government in recent decades. As previously discussed, major
historical events, including the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the rise of Iran’s urban middle-class
and the country’s rapidly growing population, its improved infrastructural and education system,
as well as the increasing impact of technology and globalization, are important events that must
be considered in discussions of today’s Iranian youth.144
The emergence of a vibrant women’s movement and an increasingly rebellious youth
population characterized the 1990s, a decade that would soon thereafter be linked with the
beginning of Iran’s post-Islamist Era.145 Post-Islamism is heralded by a shift in ideological and
material expectations of what a post-revolutionary Iran should encompass. For specific groups
such as students and youth, women, and the growing professional class post-Islamism
represented a move toward more open thought and political pluralism.146 In essence, it embodied
a “…blend of republican ideals and religious ethics, with “religious democracy” as its political
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mission.”147 Unlike the religious edicts under which the Islamic Republic was born, postIslamism encompassed a desire for political reform through a separation of religion and the
State, democratization, and the emergence of resistance movements from the most marginalized
sectors in society, namely students, youth, and women.148
During this decade countless women’s organizations were formed, including magazine
editorials and e-zines, the creation of which propelled the growth of the post-Islamist feminist
movement during the reformist period.149 Divergent feminist voices, including secular and
religious, discussed issues of political and religious significance, such as the legitimacy of
certain positions within the government, like the Guardian Jurist, the Supreme Leader, and the
lack of separation of religion and state.150 The move toward a post-Islamist polity encouraged the
emergence of a more intensely open and critical dialogue than anything preceding it since the
early years of the revolution.
While secular and Islamist feminists differed in their ideological perspectives of feminist
interpretation, the post-Islamist era afforded new opportunities for strategic resistance that sought
to enhance the social and political rights of Iranian women in general. Islamist gender
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activists,151 those who believe in a reinterpretation of Islamic law based on principals of “Islamic
justice,” have done so with the aim to “…fundamentally challenge conventional gender visions
often presented as “Islamic”” in order to work toward greater gender equality within Iranian
society.152 Islamic feminists have worked within the parameters of religious ideologies to
redefine women’s social and legal positions in accordance with Iran’s Shari’a law. While secular
feminists’ efforts have largely been stifled because of their inability to work effectively within
the context of the Islamic Republic’s legislative structure, Islamic feminists have utilized the
structures of religion as a way to reinterpret and redefine laws that are perceived as misaligned
with Islam’s true interpretation of women’s roles in an Islamic society.153
In 1992, for example, a law passed in the Islamic parliament that mandated that any man
filing for divorce from his wife must first pay her equivalent wages for her housework for the
length of their marriage.154 This law was originally petitioned and campaigned for by Islamist
women activists, who argued for greater economic protection for women within an Islamic
framework. This law effectively worked against male legal privilege in marital agreements by
guaranteeing wages as compensation for women’s domestic labor.155 Hoodfar writes, “The new
wave of Islamist feminists, with their unconventional and women-centred interpretations of
Islam, is challenging and reforming Islamic doctrine from within, rather than imposing or
advocating a Western model of gender relations.”156 It is as a direct result of “agitation by
151
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activist Islamic women,” that the legal restraints on women’s rights were significantly
diminished. By arguing that gender-based restrictions undermine the ethics of Islamic principles,
female activists petitioned for increased access to educational, financial, and employment
opportunities that they were otherwise prohibited from engaging in.157
Additionally, President Rafasnjani’s administration throughout the early- and mid-1990s
encouraged women’s participation in the sciences and medicine, and “established quotas of 25
percent female in the fields of neurology, brain surgery, cardiology, and similar
specializations.”158 Islamic women activists aggressively petitioned for these legal changes as
well as for greater access to professional opportunities, and by the middle of the decade female
parliamentarians were issuing more aggressive, more assertive statements on the status of
women in the Islamic Republic, in what Valentine M. Moghadam argues is more in line with
“what may be called “global feminism.””159 It is clear based on these events that Iranian women
acted on their own behalf, as agents of social change within the constraints of the Republic’s
religious laws. It is as a direct result of their resiliency and challenges to social norms and legal
restrictions that they achieved increased access and opportunities in areas of employment and
education.160
While Islamic feminist activists worked against gender inequality within the confines of
the Islamic Republic, secular feminists like Elaheh Rostami Povey reasoned in contrast, that as
long as religion and the State were comingled in Iran’s legislative and political structures, the
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potential for gender equality will never be realized.161 As Mehrangiz Kar, a female Iranian
lawyer and activist, argued,
The Muslim reformers who believe that Islam is a dynamic religion and are in
favour of modification of the Islamic law, don’t really believe in equality between
men and women. They believe that women and men have been born to play
different roles in life and therefore they must be subject to different laws and
regulations within family and society.162
Secular feminism therefore emerged in Iran as a ‘citizens’ rights’ movement, which is
fundamentally grounded in the belief that equality should exist for all individuals (and that the
same opportunities should exist for both men and women), both Muslim and non-Muslim, and
should not be rooted in a singular religious text.163
Although initial actions by both secular and Muslim feminists in the early stages of the
reformist movement indicated a potential for collective organizing around women’s issues, by
the start of the new millennium, it became clear that the differences between the parties were
both ideological and fundamental. In one passage of a Human Rights Quarterly issue, these
distinctions are identified by Rebecca Barlow and Shahram Akbarzadeh: “Religious-oriented
feminists were ultimately committed to upholding Islam as the solution to the plight of Iranian
women. The Islamic State, in its idealized form, was integral to this vision.”164 In contrast,
secular feminism “does not apportion to Islam the grave responsibility of solving women’s
problems in Iran. In fact, secular-oriented feminists view the merging of Islam and politics as a
central part of the problem that Iranian women face.”165 While religious-oriented feminists have
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in the last decade worked within the legislative parameters of the Islamic Republic, they have
according to many secular feminists, been able to sustain relatively little lasting change to the
status of women in Iran, despite women’s unprecedented participation in the country’s university
system and as members of the professional labor force.166 So long as Islamic discourse remains
an integral component of Iran’s legislative framework, secular feminists like Povey and Kar, see
little potential for effective and long-lasting change for women’s legal status in Iran. Still, it
should be emphasized that Islamic feminists have achieved a great deal in terms of legislative
reform in recent decades, far more in fact than secular feminists, whose opposition to the
religious structure of the government prohibits them from achieving substantive reforms for
women. For example, Islamic activists have increasingly petitioned for economic compensation
for domestic duties and housework labor. This law was in fact passed in 1993, which guaranteed
women wages for their domestic services.167 Such an accomplishment demonstrates the
perseverance of Islamic feminists who have worked within the scriptures of Islamic texts as a
way to increase women’s financial autonomy and self-determination.
Iranian Youth Culture
Youth were no less invigorated than feminists and women activists during this period and
young people increasingly exhibited rebellious behavior, defiance of moral and political
authority, and participated in underground subcultures.168 Recent years have also witnessed
greater disapproval of the government’s rigid patriarchal rule, and youth culture is largely
characterized by its praise for individualism, its rejection of violence, and an appreciation of
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tolerance and non-violence.169 Their clothing, values, and expression of self demonstrate both
their rejection of State-imposed disciplining of the body as well as the influence of globalization,
consumption, and fashion on their individual choices and youth culture. Despite these narratives,
images of both “modern” and “traditional” Iranian women are subsumed with sexualized codes,
and “…attitudes that privilege men’s desire and sexual agency at women’s expense are held by
most members of society: women and men, young and old”.170 Much like the West, sexual
harassment, sexual objectification, double standards, and discrimination in the workplace are
common experiences for younger Iranian women.171
In their work titled, “Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: Young Iranian Women Today,”
Norma Moruzzi and Fatemeh Sadeghi address emerging trends in sexuality and gender discourse
among youth populations in Iran. Their analysis focuses specifically on the evolution of postrevolutionary Iranian society and the historical markers that have shaped contemporary trends
among Iran’s modern youth population. By focusing on two key factors of social developmenteducation and fertility-Moruzzi and Sadeghi weigh the current status of women in postrevolutionary Iran. According to the statistical evidence presented in this article, Iranian women
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are by and large educated, mobile, and experiencing
later marriages and fewer pregnancies than women in previous generations.172
However, rather than having to engage with “formal traditionalism,” according to their
analysis, contemporary Iranian women must now negotiate with “specifically modern forms” of
169
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sexual inequalities. They write, “The decline of formal traditionalism has meant that gender
inequality has evolved into specifically modern forms: sexual harassment on the street, gender
discrimination in the workplace and the sexual double standard in the bedroom.”173 Indeed this
has been the case for most of the participants during our interviews. Complaints of sexual double
standards (particularly relating to virginity and women’s domestic obligations) as well as men’s
sense of entitlement to women’s bodies are frequent subjects of discussion during our
conversations.
Despite this, younger generations openly engage in “heterosexual affection, including
kissing, flirting and horseplay, and even religious girls and boys “hanging out” together, mark
the new generation as pleasure seekers.”174 This recent development has, among other factors,
led to increased occurrences of pre-marital sexual relations among youth. However, still bound
to the standards and traditions of patriarchy, young Iranian women find themselves increasingly
in difficult positions, as they are pressured by their boyfriends to engage in sexual activity, but
are then judged by patriarchal social standards, which still mandate virginity for unwed
women.175 As one young woman states in an interview with author Pardis Mahdavi, “Oh sure,
you can have sex with him, if you want. But in the end he’s not gonna propose to you, and
you’re not going be the one he’s going to marry….We just have to keep reassuring them that yes,
you are my first, you are the first boyfriend I’ve had. It’s not ideal, but he won’t marry you if he
doesn’t think you’re his first.”176 Young women are either pressured into having sex or, if they
refuse, are accused of “frigidity” by their male companions.177
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So, what does this mean for young women, who are still bound to modern-day sexual
double standards of sexual purity and honor, but who are ultimately pressured by their male
peers to engage in sexually promiscuous activity before marriage? The unfortunate conclusion
for women, as measured by Moruzzi and Sadgehi, is that the reality of young women’s lives in
contemporary Iran, while improved in areas of education, fertility, and employment, are still
confounded with sexual inequalities and sexual double standards.178 As a country with one of the
highest documented surgical hymen-repair rates in the world, how are women ultimately able to
exercise agency in these situations?179 While engaging in pre-marital sexual activity often is
perceived as a ‘liberating’ act for younger women, particularly for those from more secular
backgrounds, to what extent do the consequences of these choices, as sexually ‘active’ unmarried
women, continue to present social obstacles within this globalized, trendy, middle- and upperclass youth culture? While younger people are openly and actively engaging in conversations
about sex, as well as pre-marital sexual behavior, it is clear women are still confounded by ageold traditions of patriarchy and sexual double standards within a paradox of a culture that
increasingly promotes pre-marital sexual activity.
This has certainly been the case for several of the participants of this study, who
recognize that sexual ‘purity’ and marriage are still integral to the idealized Iranian femininity.
Still, several have intimated that pre-marital sexual activity for young women, while largely
frowned upon by society at large, has over time become more acceptable, particularly for
middle- and upper-class secular families. In several cases, the participants who come from this
specific population—middle- and upper-class secular families—openly engaged with their
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boyfriends prior to marriage, although some still felt compelled to keep their relationships
private from certain male family members.
In recent years, numerous scholars have studies the changing social landscape of
sexuality among today’s Iranian youth. One such author, again Fatemeh Sadeghi, has researched
young women’s sexual experiences in Iran as a way to engage discussions about the shifting
dynamics of women’s sexuality further. 180 The politicization of sexuality, and the control of
public spaces that came shortly after the 1979 Revolution resulted in a sudden change in the role
of public and private spaces in Iran, according to Sadeghi’s assessment.181 Where public spaces
(e.g. parks, cinemas, restaurants, and universities) were once seen as places free from the
constraints of social convention within the family, the introduction of the ‘morality police’ by the
Islamic Republic and its repression of mixed-sex interactions in public have, as she suggests,
forced today’s youth to find alternative venues for social interaction and entertainment.182
Seeking refuge from what has become a repressive public atmosphere; youth now look to
the home as a retreat from the intrusions of the State on social convention and behavior. Sadgehi
writes, “Despite the Islamisation of public spaces the formal sphere, private and familial spaces
have remained relatively open and may have become even more so as a response to the closure
of public alternatives.”183 This shift has led to increasing frequencies of pre-marital sexual
relations between young women and men. Although tolerance for sexual engagement is much
more accepted than in previous generations, today’s youth are bound to the underpinnings of
patriarchy that favor male sexual privilege. The contradictory nature of this development
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presents increasingly difficult situations for young women. As suggested by other leading
scholars, situations like these can be particularly detrimental for young women, who not only
experience greater instances of sexual violence in the home, but also continue to face social
conventions based on female sexual honor and male sexual privilege. Sadgehi writes,
On the one hand, the male-oriented society expects them to be sexually more open than
traditional girls. On the other hand, this more open female sexuality is not treated by the
same society as an appropriate form of feminine behavior. Being a modern girl in Iran
means being trapped between traditionalism, which keeps them uncritical and
acquiescent toward the norms and attitudes of discriminative society, and a patriarchal
modernity, which makes them more bodily expressive.184
By examining these conflicting cultural norms, which simultaneously applaud women for
fulfilling male sexual desires by engaging in sexual activity and which then in turn, condemn
them for participating in the very act for which they had originally been praised, Sadeghi
demonstrates rather eloquently the problematic nature of these types of sexual encounters in
terms of women’s ability to exercise agency.
Young women certainly face similar social obstacles in Western youth culture as well.
There are countless books written by Western feminist scholars and activists who advocate for a
more critical interpretation of the dynamics of gender and sexual practices in mainstream
Western youth culture, and the paralyzing effects that sexual double standards have on women’s
ability to practice agency in sexual relationships. For example, in her ethnographic research on
young, adolescent women, Dr. Deborah L. Tolman, founder of the Center for Research on
Gender and Sexuality at San Francisco State University, has found that the discourse of women’s
sexual desire is typically not present among young men and women. Moreover, there continues
to be the prevailing idea that fulfilling male sexual pleasure as purely ‘sexualized’ objects
without any subjectivity is the primary function for many young women today. She writes,
184
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“Even as we enter the twenty-first century, the possibility that girls might be interested in
sexuality in their own right rather than as objects of boys’ desire is met with resistance and
discomfort.”185
Tolman also suggests that throughout adolescence and into adulthood, young people are
consistently faced with a “set of rules, principles, and roles” that are otherwise “mapped” out for
them as guiding points for engaging in ‘appropriate’ heterosexual, romantic relationships.
Central to these points are discussions about male-female sexual interactions, which flood young
women with oftentimes contradictory sets of sexual expectations for themselves and for the
young men they sexually engage with. Sexual double standards, that include such contradictory
ideas like “…don’t be a prude but don’t be a slut…” and “…have (or fake) orgasms to ensure
that your boyfriend is not made to feel inadequate, if you want to keep him” present a barrage of
competing ideas about women’s sexuality, none of which offer opportunities to young women to
exercise agency or engage self-awareness.186 Based on these comparisons, it becomes very clear
that many young women, both in Iran and in America and throughout the West, face similar sets
of sexual double standards that require a more critical, ‘feminist’ interpretation in order for
meaningful and long-lasting change to take place.
Theories of Meaning and Representation
Michel Foucault coined the term “discursive formation” as a way to describe the way the
correlative relationship between ideas and concepts, objects, language, and the body.187 The
body, according to Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge, is the site where all forms of
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history—economic, political, cultural—are manifested and realized.188 Foucault’s analysis of the
subject, as an ever-changing form, is “…constantly dissolved and recreated in different
configurations, along with other forms of knowledge and social practices.”189 This means that the
body takes on very specific cultural and political meanings as it negotiates and/or subverts with
various forms of social and political power. The emergence of what Asef Bayat coins a
“youthful” identity in modern-day Iran can be argued, then, in terms of Foucault’s theory of
power and knowledge. Young individuals who resist State-imposed ideologies subvert authority
through the creation of subaltern movements and the construction of a youth identity.190
Like Foucault, Judith Butler’s theory of gender also defines categories of identity as
products of discourse and ‘regimes of power/knowledge.’191 Her analysis of gender as a socially
constructed category is a highly controverted one; in fact, Butler situates categories of identity as
“...effect[s] of signifying practices rooted in regimes of power/knowledge characterized as
compulsory heterosexuality and phallocentrism.”192 A statement such as this one, which situates
a symbol of male dominance at the core of gender construction, disrupts our understanding of
gender identities as based on inherent biological or ‘natural’ characteristics. Seeking inspiration
from twentieth-century French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, who famously argued that ‘one is
not born, but rather becomes a woman,’ Judith Butler further argued that gender is a process of
“acculturation,” and not based on these assumed ‘natural’ or biological traits.193
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The assumption within contemporary Iranian society that men have less control over their
sexuality than women is an exact case in point. This assumption, one which positions “female
passivity” to “male activity” in terms of sexuality, is, as both Sadgehi and Moruzzi argue, upheld
within three areas, including Islamic law, social conventions based on patriarchal traditions, and
the prevailing viewpoints of Iran’s younger population. These three “competing and overlapping
discourses of sexuality,” as they suggest, are what further sustain the idea that women have an
easier time controlling their sexual desires than men. Still, it is evident based on my own
conversations with the participants, that this discourse is constantly being challenged and in
certain cases, ignored altogether. In several cases, for example, a number of participants have
indicated that their families (mostly middle- and upper-class secular) supported their romantic
relationships as young, unmarried women.
In Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex, she argues that gender is a process of ‘becoming,’
of taking part in a process of the “cultural interpretation of sex,” which assigns specific
characteristics of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ as a way to create distinct categories and sexual
binaries within a social context.194 Judith Butler in turn, argues that sex “itself is an effect of
discursive practices, rather than an origin, ‘produced’ through regulatory processes, practices,
and structures.”195 She further contends that gender ‘norms’ or ‘behaviors’ are byproducts of the
process of discursive knowledge formations constructed by those in power. Within a
conservative religious environment such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Azam Torab, inspired
by the works of Judith Butler, argues that gender difference and gender hierarchies are created
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and maintained through a strict interpretation of the male-female binary socially constructed out
of conservative religious and cultural beliefs.196
According to the Iran’s conservative religious thinkers, men and women are
differentiated based on the idea that they possess inherently distinct emotional and biological
traits; that they are not equal, but complementary in their physiological makeup. The
perpetuation of women’s legal and social inequality, therefore, is based on the idea that the
“complementary concepts” of aql (which represents rationality and reason) and nafs (which
signifies lust, passion, and the animalistic part of nature) are gendered in their composition.
These two parts respectively signify “order, control, and morality” and “disorder, lack of control,
passion, and desire...,” with the first representing the masculine and the latter the feminine.197
Women’s gender identities, according to State religious discourse, are therefore grounded in the
idea that their inherent, biological traits are based on sexual desire and irrationality, while men’s
gender identities are rooted in principles of order and reason.
“[The religious authorities] have gone to great lengths to avoid gender ambiguities,
rigidly prescribing the boundaries between the sexes with legal codes and rituals
pertaining to the minute details of everyday interaction. This is based on the construct
that women and men have different mental and emotional capacities, which are in turn
linked to ideas about agency, autonomy and morality.”198
The inequality of women (in legal and social terms) is therefore directly linked to their presumed
biological inferiority, and through which gender hierarchies are maintained and substantiated in
religious, nationalist discourse.199 Still, while the State’s attempts at creating a gender identity
grounded in specific gender differences, ordinary people consistently challenge these
dichotomies by pushing social boundaries.
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Such statements are the trademark of patriarchal discourse and similar arguments can be
found across the history of not just Iran, Muslim societies, or the Middle East, but of Europe,
Asia, and elsewhere. For example, women during the nineteenth century Victorian era were
idealized in terms of their “sexual passivity,” their “delicacy and dreaminess,” and unpredictable
emotional nature.200 These ideas were largely grounded in ‘scientific’ theories predicated by
male doctors of that time, the most prominent of which includes Sigmund Freud, who argued
that women’s ‘normal’ inferior biological traits were grounded in their unpredictable nature, a
hysterical personality, and a largely egocentric and narcissistic persona.201
Because women represent the family as both nurturers and keepers of the domestic
sphere, the ‘ideal’ woman is often essentialized into an unchanging, static idea. At the core, she
represents the family, and embodies cultural ‘authenticity’ by maintaining and upholding her
biological role within the family as a mother. Her sexuality, by default, is an extension of this
idealized image. By lending it this ‘idealized’ imagery, women bodies and their sexuality
become in turn politicized through the discourse of religion and the State. However, women who
engage in subversive or resistive behavior are ‘reconstructing’ the boundaries of gender by
challenging prevailing legal and social norms (e.g. more moderate veiling, increased sexual
activity). They are utilizing sub-culture and methods of resistance (such as altering their
behavior, dress, or public visibility) as way to create alternate discourses of women’s gender
identity against the prevailing discursive production of knowledge about the concept of gender
generally and about women specifically.202
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For example, women in post-revolutionary Iran have argued for a re-evaluation of their
legal and social status by challenging gender normativity and the prescribed gender roles.
Although contentions between secular and religious women have exposed the chasm between
these two parties’ interpretations of ‘gender’ and the appropriate role of women in society, they
are nevertheless pushing the boundaries of traditional ideas, customs, and norms. For example,
recent decades have increasingly witnessed how women have negotiated the social and religious
expectations surrounding marriage, child-rearing, household dynamics, and political and social
involvement and visibility.203 They are in essence, creating new opportunities for social and
political advancement in spite of the restrictive circumstances that otherwise surround them.
Consumer Culture Theory
Consumer culture theory argues that in a market-driven society, consumers act as
intentional and active subjects whose actions not only reinscribe cultural norms, but can also
generate new forms of identity.204 In this model, consumption is framed within a post-modern
framework, where it acts as a process of active engagement “…used to generate cultural
meanings and identities.”205 Using the marketplace as a resource, consumers utilize advertising,
the media, and fashion, as a way to engage self-expression with symbols, dress, branding, and
trends.206 Consumer culture theory then “…investigates the socio-cultural, experiential,
symbolic, and ideological aspects of consumption…” as it relates to the creation of cultural
identities by populations.207
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For Iranian youth, again those born during or after the revolution, the resurgence of a
distinctly “youth” culture during the reformist era led to an incredible surge in consumptive
behaviors and patterns. Increased availability and access to foreign goods, including technology,
music, clothing, beauty supplies, electronics, satellite dishes, and mobile phones have paved the
way for a more fluid and dynamic cultural exchange as part of a globalized youth culture
movement.208 Recent patterns of consumption, particularly of foreign goods (e.g. fashion trends,
music, foreign movies and books) from the West, have “accelerated among Iranian youth,” who
not unlike other youth cultures in the world are taking part in an inter-cultural exchange within a
greater global cultural phenomenon.209
While the former certainly cannot be homogenized into a singular cultural entity, the use
of consumption particularly among Iran’s more wealthy middle- and upper-class cosmopolitan
population has worked in distinctively subversive ways in order to undermine the religious
ideologies imposed by the State.210 Almost all of the interview participants come from middleand upper-class families within Tehran, and almost all would identify with an intellectual or
cosmopolitan, urban social identity. With the exception of Asal (who comes from an established
middle-class Armenian community) and Parastoo (whose family is more religious), each
participant embodies these distinct subculture, cosmopolitan characteristics.
Working against both the confines of the Islamic State and the generational separation
from their parents, young people (those born during or after the revolution) are, according to the
theoretical principles of consumer culture theory, able to reimagine new social identities based
on these consumptive patterns, behaviors, and beliefs. Based on research done by theorists like
Aliakbar Jafari, there is evidence that demonstrates a shift in recent decades in mainstream youth
208
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attitudes that embrace individuality, a trend which he argues is a result of the increasing
interchange of global culture and immersion in a consumer-driven, market economy.211 Indeed,
younger people are consuming greater amounts of foreign music, including British punk, rap,
and heavy metal. Increasingly, students are traveling abroad to international universities,
engaging in web technology (such as blogging), and embracing a more globalized youth
culture.212 Iranian youth have, as Aliakbar Jafari argues, “depart[ed] from the grand narrative of
the state,” in order to make “their own personal choices of their identities.”213 As active
participants within a consumer-driven society, Iranian youth are faced with paradoxical
circumstances, which include an increasingly liberal economy as well as a more restrictive,
institutional Islamic republic. Youth are, based on Jafari’s ethnographic analysis of Iranian
youth, making conscientious choices as consumers of a globalized market. They are, based on
this analysis, recreating and reimagining a social identity outside of the restrictions of a more
socially, religiously, and politically traditional environment.214
For young women of the Islamic Republic, the consumption and subsequent creation of a
distinctly “youth” female identity is represented most prevalently through their physical dress,
fashion modes, and beauty standards.215 While more devout or politically radical female youth
identify with a more ‘ideal’ Islamic identity through their conservative dress, more cosmopolitan
urban youth (who typically hail from middle and upper-class families within Tehran) personify a
youth identity representative of a globalized, ‘consumerist,’ youth culture.216 As a number of
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interview participants have intimated, the use of bright colors, fashionable clothing, and
subversive veiling (in the form of a loose, colorful headscarf) are commonplace clothing trends
for many women, including those from the middle- and upper-class. Even wearing tight, snugfitting jeans underneath brightly colored manteaus have become ordinary fashion statements for
many of them, through which they attempt to undermine the State’s policies on women’s
physical appearance in public spaces.217
While these patterns of consumption are distinctly framed against the State’ s religious
discourse and touted as forms of ‘resistance’ by younger Iranian women, to what end does this
type of consumption ultimately increase women’s ability to exercise agency and act as advocates
for social change? While young women are challenging the discourse of forced Islamic rule by
the State by embracing consumerist practices and dressing more provocatively by wearing tighter
jeans and shorter manteaus, in what way do these practices simultaneously perpetuate women’s
sexual objectification by the patriarchal beliefs that are already in existence within mainstream
youth culture specifically, and within Iranian society at large? Furthermore, how does Jafari’s
analysis fall short of engaging women’s sexual agency into the conversation by failing to discuss
the practical implications of utilizing these types of consumptive practices as a form of resistance
against the State? After all, if young, middle- and upper-class women, engage in these types of
consumerist behaviors, the ultimate beneficiary of these stylistic changes are not women, but
men. The sexualized imagery offered up through these types of consumptive patterns (e.g. tighter
clothing, heavier makeup application, and shorter, snugger manteaus), while resistive of
conservative State ideologies, are still very much framed within the discourse of patriarchy and
serving the male sexual gaze.
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In her remarks on this subject, both Leela and Iranban have argued that American women
in Chicago are “plain” in comparison to the cosmopolitan women in Tehran. In many cases, both
women argue that American women wear much less makeup and that women’s clothing is much
less evocative in ‘everday,’ ordinary situations (like taking a trip to the grocery store, for
example). In several instances, Leela has witnessed women in Tehran ‘dress up’ in stiletto heels,
tight, capri-style pants, short manteaus, and silk scarves in what she called very ‘casual’ and
‘ordinary’ situations. In Chicago, this would very well be perceived by many as out of place or
entirely inappropriate choice in clothing in more ‘casual’ or ‘ordinary’ circumstances, like
picking one’s child up from school, for example.
What scholars like Moruzzi and Sadgehi argue, is that while consumption of ‘globalized’
trends like more sexualized clothing or looser veils may very well offer up alternative discourses
that work against the confines of the State, this trend is still very much framed within the
discourse of male sexual dominance that perceive women purely in ‘sexualized’ terms. This has
in fact perpetuated the hyper-sexualization of young women as they struggle to ‘fit in’ with their
peers and youth culture.218 It would hardly seem then, that this type of consumptive behavior—
the donning of tighter, colorful, and more sexualized clothing—despite the growing trend among
this population, will have any meaningful or lasting impact on women’s ability to exercise
agency outside of patriarchal norms that privilege the male gaze and male sexual pleasure. It is
clear, as both Moruzzi and Sadeghi suggest, that a critical “feminist critique” is essential to more
clearly understanding how consumption of global trends can indeed act as a vehicle for women
to exercise agency and advocate for social change.219
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Diasporic Experiences
Recent studies on diasporic communities in the West have revealed that the manifestation
of youth identity is often complicated by the intersection of culture, race, nation, and class.220 In
her recent work with South Asian adolescent girls, Meenakshi Gigi Durham argues that
adolescence, when experiences in the diaspora, can lead to an even more complex set of issues,
where elements of sexuality and gender become “…imbricated with the conundrums of the other
transition”—that is, life outside of the homeland.221
In an analysis of Iranian refugee women between 1978 and 1982, author Janet L. Bauer
narrates the accounts of two women whose personal encounters echo similar sentiments as those
of Persepolis’ protagonist. Although Satrapi’s main character leaves her homeland voluntarily,
who with her family’s urging spends most of her adolescence as a student abroad in Europe, how
might feelings of cultural displacement resemble other immigrants and refugees similar to those
interviewed by Bauer? While refugees depart their homeland involuntarily, as a result of
inhospitable physical and social conditions, Marjane left Iran because her parents feared for their
child’s safety in an increasingly volatile political environment. Despite their differences in age,
class, and education, both women Bauer interviews, much like Marjane, experience significant
obstacles and dilemmas as they renegotiate their social positions within Iranian and non-Iranian
communities located in the diaspora.222 She writes,
In many ways the struggles of Iranian refugee and immigrant women over individual
place — gender relations, sexuality, race, and identity — in the face of both opportunities
and constraints within the household and various communities of reference, are similar to
those reported for Vietnamese, Chilean, Algerian, Mexican, and other immigrant women.
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In all these cases, women serve both as intercultural negotiators and as emblems of
community status.223
As she indicates, the conceptualization of identity for young women living in the diaspora is a
complex process, one fraught with contradictory messages of maintaining cultural ‘authenticity’
and assimilation.224 Although the experiences for those directly following the 1979 Revolution
differ markedly from modern-day Iranians, the most significant point to take away from this
example is the impact of cultural displacement experienced by young individuals who begin
anew with a diasporic setting.
This has been clearly demonstrated to me by several of the interview participants, who
based on their own experiences as immigrants, have experienced significant feelings of cultural
disconnect and displacement within their own local Iranian diasporic communities as well as
within mainstream, American culture. For example, Leela, Iranban, and Parastoo argue that in
many ways, their experiences in America are marked with feelings of separation and detachment
from other Americans and within mainstream American society. Depictions of Iranians in
American media as well as personal encounters with hostile individuals have only intensified
their longing for a homeland that in many ways they feel largely separated from.
Chapter 3 Thematic Analysis and Discussion of Results
Asef Bayat’s phrase “subversive accommodation” perhaps best describes the
participants’ opposition and resistance to State-imposed policies in Iran.225 State policies aimed
at policing gender and sexuality (such as through dress or mixed-sex interactions) have, despite
(or in spite of) their oftentimes stringent enforcement, produced paradoxical results since the
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country’s revolution. This has particularly been the case for Iran’s some 42 million people under
the age of thirty, who have been touted for their subversive acts of resistance and engagement in
subculture movements against State-imposed policies and moral authorities.226 The subversion
and negotiation of existing laws dominate the participants’ narratives, as many of them recall
instances of insubordination against the government’s morality police or religious authorizes in
public settings, such as parks and universities. Similarly, others recount moments of defiance
through direct resistance of those State-imposed regulations that impact and determine women’s
appearance and propriety.
Women’s activism during the country’s 1990s reformist era provided many of the
participants with opportunities to push the boundaries of legislative restriction and individual
expression during their formative, teenage years. A strong youth- and student-led movement
during the late 1990s led to frequent confrontations with authorities, including Basiji militia,227
who often engaged in combative altercations with individuals of middle- and upper-class who
are by and large in favor of a more unrestricted, open, and secular government. In fact, in 1999
when several hundred university students peacefully protested the crackdowns on press laws
(including the closure of reformist newspaper Salaam), basijis militia stormed their dormitories
during the night, killing at least five students and injuring countless others.228 Although President
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Khatami issued an apology on behalf of the basiji, later attacks and violent crackdowns against
students made it clear that young people were the target of numerous crackdowns on alleged
violations of Islamic law by the conservative political forces.229 Since then, young people have
been largely resentful of the conservative political authority they believe has specifically targeted
them with repressive and violent tactics. As a result, student and youth populations are among
the most politicized social groups in contemporary Iran.230 Most recently, basiji militia openly
attacked peaceful protesters in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections during, which also
included night-time raids of university dorms, attacks of individual protesters, and large-scale
arrests.231
In their encounters with morality police, several participants have described how they
have been able to cleverly trick authorities, or subvert the prevailing regulations through deceit,
secrecy, and coordination with their peers, classmates, and boyfriends. Participant Leela
surmises this point best: “[Iranian women] are not silent; they are not silent at all.” While Leela
admits that American women by and large have more “ordinary” rights in terms of citizenship
rights and with regard to public appearance, Iranian women are not silenced by the prevailing
regulations imposed upon them by the State. Their daily lives, as Leela argues, are comprised
with acts of resistance. She says, “Whatever we do we are fighting for it, we are not weak.” In
these women’s narratives, they often speak of resistance and adolescent rebellion
interchangeably. While youth rebellion is often characterized by acts of defiance against parental
and/or community authority, these women have made it explicit that resistance to authority,
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whether parental, State, religious, or community, have in many ways became politicized in the
decades following the revolution.
Since the Islamic Revolution, every day, ‘ordinary’ aspects of life are regulated, which
therefore propel Iranian youth to engage what would otherwise be considered ‘normal’
adolescent behavior into political acts of resistance against a controlling and socially rigid public
environment.232 This means that those behaviors often associated with adolescence, including
rebellion against parental and community authority, socializing and flirting with individuals of
the opposite sex, attending mixed-sex parties, and pushing acceptable social boundaries, have as
a result been transformed into acts of social resistance against the numerous institutions of
authority present in their lives.233
In addition to the State’s regulations on dress and behavior, young people still must
navigate other institutions that attempt to police their behavior, including parental authority,
community regulations and traditional, patriarchal norms, as well as police and local authorities
that patrol neighborhoods. Daily activities (such as frequenting coffee houses and engaging in
subversive dress) have subsequently become politicized by those very institutions that attempt to
regulate and control them.234 ‘Ordinary’ or ‘normal’ activities, such as one’s choice in dress,
hairstyle, choice of music, or where one socializes, often signify political acts of resistance or
become ‘politicized’ against intrusive State regulations. What this does not mean, however, is
that all subversion has political meaning or that defiance of regulations necessarily equates
conscious and intentional resistance against State-policing. I want to also emphasize that I do not
use this term uncritically and without consideration for its greater meaning during times of
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intense political conflict and violence. Moreover, given the multi-definitional and subjective
nature of this term, I refer to Rebecca Raby’s research on youth and adolescent resistance from a
post-modernist perspective as a way to identify more clearly the ways that strategic forms of
‘subversion’ and ‘negotiation’ can be used to effectively work around social confines as well to
create alternative discourses of knowledge and truth.235 Relying on Foucault’s analysis of power
and knowledge, as Raby does, I argue in this particular context that ‘resistance’ is about
disrupting social normatives and social institutions of power, whereby subjects engage
subversive tactics that undermine the legitimacy of these institutions from which social notions
of ‘normalcy’ are created and preserved.236 In so doing, it can be argued that opportunities for
individuals to exercise agency—the ability to act autonomously and with self-determination—is
thereby increased.237 ‘Agency’ then, is a term used to identify ways that individuals employ or
‘reclaim’ subjectivity and positionality within specific institutions of power.
I use these terms as a way to demonstrate the micro-practices of opposition used by a
select group of young, secular middle- and upper-class women who by and large oppose the
State’s regulations on women’s bodies and comportment, and who simultaneously navigate the
changing social landscape of Iranian society and culture. Still, one’s choice in dress, while in
defiance of State regulations, may at times have more to do with asserting class or status, or
attempts at “fitting in” with certain youth fashion trends, rather than as a conscious form of
political opposition. Just as Western youth might dress in certain fashion trends (like Punk or
Baller) to ascribe to a particular youth culture and to “fit in” with a collective youth identity, so
too do Iranian youth engage in similar behaviors and trends. Just because this particular segment
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of Iran’s urban population embraces global fashion trends and a ‘consumerist’ identity, does not
mean that there is a sweeping movement of conscious resistance among middle- and upper-class
youth populations who engage in these subversive behaviors. If anything, it seems based on
much of the ethnographic data gathered from this particular demographic makeup, that there is
an uncritical acceptance of the ‘consumerist’ culture that encourages alternative trends in fashion
and makeup without considering the implications of sexual double standards that persist within
this new paradigm.238
Still, while not all adolescent rebellion can be categorized as ‘intentional’ or
‘conscientious’ in terms of its political significance, it is evident that a large percentage of youth
culture (particularly in Iran’s urban spaces) is highly politicized in terms of its ‘ordinary’
practices of resistance enacted against State-imposed regulations and policing. For example, in a
recent survey of Iranian youth in Tehran, Shahram Khosravi argues the following:
The Islamic order has striven to penetrate the very bases of people’s lives: what they eat
and drink, how they dress, whom they sleep with, whom they look at. In such an
atmosphere every aspect of daily life takes on a political meaning. An Iranian takes a
political position in his/her everyday practices, from patterns of dressing to hairdos. As
lifestyle is politicized, coffee shops play a significant role in the creation of political
opinion by being arenas for “banal politics.”239
In this way, creating subaltern or subculture movements that counter (and in turn resist) different
forms of authority have transformed what many might consider ordinary, daily practices into
political stances of rebellion and resistance. For many young people, an invasive State authority
further propels them to embrace a globalized identity and individualistic values and goals.240 The
theoretical underpinnings of consumer culture theory, from one angle, helps us understand how
the consumption of global culture and its subsequent transformation into something essentially
238
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“Iranian,” offers an opportunity for young people to create an alternative social identity outside
of the prevailing regulations of the State and its sanctioned practices, or outside of society’s
norms at large. This does not mean, however, that an uncritical ‘consumption’ of global culture
necessarily equates a ‘liberated’ social identity or greater opportunities to exercise agency for
young women. The consumption of global fashion trends, and more ‘individualistic,’ tolerant
attitudes merely suggest that young people are individually reasserting their identity outside of
the State’s religious ideologies and distancing themselves from the discourse of the State.241
Still, there is resistance of these norms that falls outside of the ‘consumerist’ argument.
Both Leela and Iranban purchase illegally imported books in ‘underground’ bookstores as well
as media and film. Although these are banned by the government, Leela and Iranban argue that
anyone can purchase these items with relative ease, despite the State’s regulations on them.
There is a desire to learn about different ideas and philosophical points of view, they both argue.
Michel Foucault coined the term “heterotopia” to describe a place which lies in between
‘social institutions’ and outside of the confines of social norms. It is, he argues, “…a kind of
utopia where any real cultural space is contested and inverted in the process of representation;
places that are, therefore, outside the spatial boundaries conceived of by society….”242 Public
spaces, the representation of bodies (through dress and hair), the consumption of goods (through
brand names, music, art) have therefore become places of political contestation, “heterotopias” in
their own right, against State-enforced regulations. While these have become spaces of critical
contestation for many young people, one can also argue that these “heterotopia’s,” while
resistive of the State’s policies and practices, have largely failed to dismantle patriarchal norms
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that continue to subject women to unfair sexual double standards in favor of men’s sexual
fulfillment and domination. This means that many ‘global’ trends, like music and fashion, are
embraced unabashedly by young women, without further consideration of the sexual standards
that are still in many ways, stacked against them. While consumption of certain ‘global’ music,
like the internationally acclaimed pop group Pussy Cat Dolls or rap may very well work against
the confines of the State, this type of music by and large still subjects women to sexual double
standards and a culture of hyper-sexualization.
Every day is Resistance: Acts of Defiance in Iran and America
For Leela and Iranban, ages 31 and 32, daily acts of subversion were common
occurrences during their childhood. As young children born during the Revolution, Leela and
Iranban experienced the initial severity of the Islamic Republic’s religious edicts in grade school,
where religious education became the primary focus and compulsory veiling was required for
single-sex schools. Leela and Iranban recall specific instances of resistance against the teachers
and mullahs because of the intensely strict atmosphere in school. Often questioned about their
parents’ private lives (such as whether they consumed alcohol at parties), both participants
describe the difficulty of these experiences and the fear they lived with as children. Leela also
recalls several times throughout her childhood when her mother instructed her on the
wrongdoings of the religious government, particularly with regard to its extreme religiosity and
limitations on women’s rights.243
In the years following the revolution, the Islamic government placed a heavy emphasis on
the segregation of the sexes and stringently enforced Islamic dress and veiling. Women who
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opposed these policies and the abrogation of laws in favor of gender equality were either pushed
into exile abroad or into the private spaces of their homes. Strict enforcement of discriminatory
practices and brutal treatment of leftists during the 1980s forced many Iranians to flee the
country to evade arrest, torture, and even execution. Understanding the historical context under
which these events took place is an important aspect of these participant’s narratives.244
During an interview with Leela and Iranban, they jokingly laugh about their methods of
resistance used during their adolescence. During the obligatory prayer times in school, both
Leela and Iranban, like many of their other female classmates, regularly evaded this activity
under the pretext of menstruation, a time during which women are exempt according to Islamic
Law.245 For both of these women, this activity was a State-imposed edict that was forced upon
them by their religious school teachers. While Iranban admits she was somewhat religious as a
child, she argues that eventually this changed: “As a child I couldn’t understand why during my
break, I should go and pray. After a while, I grew up and saw that [what] they’re trying to teach
us, and all of the subjects that they were trying to teach us, were meaningless. In Iran, we made
fun out of many things that the government wanted us to practice in a serious way…” “Making
fun” out of these sorts of religious experiences became methods of subversion and evasion for
women like Leela and Iranban.
Making fun of State authority and ideologies is just one way that Leela and Iranban
expressed their disassociation from the prevailing governmental regulations that were largely
forced upon them and their families after the revolution. One might ask (as I did) how it is
possible that a young child or adolescent is capable of consciously engaging in political acts of
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resistance against a political regime. How are these behaviors different from typical ‘youthful’
rebellion against authority? How were these actions intentional and consciously formulated
against a religious revolutionary movement? For both Leela and Iranban, subversion of
prevailing regulations became an integral part of their identity as ‘Iranian girls’ as a result of the
regulations that were imposed upon them at such an early age. Their identities, as young girls
and later as young women, were highly politicized. Asef Bayat’s term “subversive
accommodation,” was used by these women as a way to disengage one’s self from a religious
system that suppressed them and their families.
Smoking in Public Spaces
In fact, throughout our conversations, both Iranban and Leela talk about how resisting
State-imposed regulations have become a central part of their daily lives in Tehran. Iranban
argues, “My very good resistance is smoking, I used to drive and smoke, sometimes in a park
even. When it was snowing, I used to smoke weed in the park.” Both Leela and Iranban laugh at
this statement, and Leela says, “You are so brave! If they arrested you….,” to which Iranban
laughingly responds, “I know, they would kill me!” Later Leela says to Iranban in a much more
serious tone, “But I think you were so brave that you smoked in Iran in the park, because in Iran
I smoked while I was driving, but I never had the courage to smoke in the street because I
couldn’t tolerate the reaction of the people.” According to the Leela and Iranban, the social taboo
for women who smoke publically is largely associated with sexual looseness and promiscuity in
Iran.246 While this point remains one of contention (and therefore unconfirmed), smoking in
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public spaces in Tehran is an act that has recently come under attack by Iranian officials on the
grounds of its negative health effects, and despite the alleged social taboos that are ascribed to
women who smoke in public, it is legal for both men and women to smoke cigarettes.247 While
recent public smoking bans have largely fallen under the discourse of public health concerns,
awareness of State policies on smoking helps to contextualize how this behavior has in recent
years become increasingly associated with ‘unhealthy’ and ‘marginalized’ behavior.
The bans on women smoking, while distinct from the bans on smoking in public spaces at
large, are representative more broadly of an ideological shift that increasingly perceives female
smokers as amoral and sexually loose. For Leela, being able to smoke openly was something that
was extraordinarily liberating when she first came to Chicago, even though Chicago is
increasingly prohibiting smoking tobacco in its public spaces. She says,
I smoked a cigarette and maybe more than anything else, here it was fun for me, because
I was so free to do that and it was an ordinary thing to do and no one looked at me in a
strange way [because] I’m a woman and smoking a cigarette….It’s strange for women to
walk and smoke so freely and easily…..But [in America] I had the experience, because it
was only me and my cigarette and it was nothing special. It was a sense of freedom in a
way that I never really experienced with my cigarette that I never had in Iran.
But, as Leela later suggests, it is for this very reason that young Iranian women utilize smoking
as a way to sexually entice other men and as a form of youthful resistance against a repressive
society. This is not altogether different here in the United States and in Chicago in particular,
where smoking bans are prevalent and the stigma against smoking in public is increasingly
perceived as “disgusting” habit by other non-smokers. When asked why she engages in resistive
activity, Iranban responds, “I’m against the revolution, I’m against the rules, I don’t like the
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rules. Even [in America],” she says, “…if I can find the weed,248 I will smoke it in the street. It is
my health, it’s my freedom, isn’t it?! No one can tell me!” Still, this apparent equation of
smoking in public in Chicago with ‘liberation’ perhaps is more broadly representative of her own
feelings of anonymity as an immigrant who only recently came to America and who is still not
integrated into daily life within this urban space.
In 2009, smoking in public places in Tehran became illegal. Citing its health dangers and
negative effects on the population at large, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf announced
that smoking in public areas, including all public organizations, hotels, restaurants, tea houses,
and coffee shops would no longer be allowed.249 Only five years prior, smoking the water-pipe (a
century’s-long tradition throughout the region) was illegalized in public spaces in Tehran. While
this activity was prohibited on the grounds of its health-related concerns, the ban came amidst a
crackdown by moral authorities on Iranian youth who violated Islamic dress codes and mingle
with individuals of the opposite sex. Officials say smoking the water-pipe in tea houses has led
to increased instances of social mingling and flirting by young men and women.250
Although the social taboo allegedly associated with smoking in public spaces in Iran
remains a topic of debate, awareness of its overall negative health consequences has become its
primary focus in recent years. This ban resembles countless others that in recent decades have
been enacted in countries across the globe, which prohibit smoking on the grounds of its negative
health effects. In fact, smoking was largely linked with social deviance and immorality
throughout the twentieth century in the United States. It, along with the excess consumption of
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alcohol, drugs, gambling, swearing, and sexual practices, has throughout recent American history
been associated with moral deviance, social irresponsibility, and unrespectable behavior.251
While smoking bans have been enacted in recent decades because of their negative health
effects, the negative cultural connotation associated with this behavior undoubtedly plays an
important role in curbing smoking rates among many Americans.252 The separation of smokers to
segregated public spaces (often on the margins of a communal space) further “…relegate[s]
smokers to the demeaning social territory of the deviant and faintly unrespectable.”253
What is interesting about this recent development in American history has to do with the
dominant social ideology that originally linked smoking (as well as drinking, drugs, etc.) with
social deviance and immoral behavior in the early twentieth century. The evolution of this
ideology has transformed these actions into illegal behaviors subject to the regulations of local
and State authorities. Much like the act of smoking for young women in Tehran may be
perceived by some as a symbol of sexual looseness and promiscuity, recent bans on smoking
tobacco and the water-pipe demonstrate how the disdain for this behavior, as well as it’s negative
health consequences, have potentially propelled this behavior into a place of social deviancy in
contemporary Iranian society.
For Iranban, it is clear that smoking signifies a political act of resistance against laws as
well as a subversion of social norms that prevent her from engaging in a pleasurable activity. She
has made it explicitly clear that despite the restrictions (such as public segregation for smokers
and non-smokers), she is unwilling to accept these laws that ultimately diminish her access to
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smoking freely and openly in public. On the other hand, while Leela associates smoking in
public spaces in Chicago with a sense of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation,’ if smoking bans criminalize
this act any further, she argues this could change for her as well. Conforming to and perhaps
even internalizing these social norms (that smoking is an addictive and ‘disgusting’ habit) could
potentially lead Leela disassociate herself from this behavior entirely.
Measuring Women’s Success and Sexual Double Standards
Interestingly, the participants’ experiences in America highlight what they believe is a
‘complacency’ by young American women to combat instances of sexual double standards and
the sexual objectification of women’s bodies in Western media and advertisements. In a country
where the State polices women’s bodies in a distinctly different way, various participants have
argued that American society places undue pressure on women to achieve economic and familial
success in lieu of achieving substantial meaning in their lives. In other words, they believe that
American women are pressured to achieve ‘success’ in areas of employment and family life, by
having accomplished both high-paying jobs, and also by fulfilling the role of wife and mother,
most often to multiple children. This observation is certainly not new, in actuality it has been a
strong point of contention for Western women since the 1960s and 70s.254
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Other participants have also noted that self-induced seclusion has been used out of
extreme frustration toward a society that they believe is racist toward Middle Eastern people, and
particularly toward Iranians. Because subversion, resistance, and evasion plays such an integral
role in the women’s lives, both in Iran and in America, it functions as the central theme in
discussions of issues of dress, household dynamics, and women’s values and self-expression.
Other participants have talked about resistance against the prevailing social norms, which
for many of them, are still steeped in traditional, patriarchal norms and outdated modes of
thinking. Male chauvinism and sexism are by and large the most common complaints issued by
the interviewees, who agree that Iranian men feel a sense of entitlement and access to women’s
bodies in public spaces. Asal recalls a particularly frightening encounter with an older man as a
young, teenage girl while walking along a secluded bridge to school. Asal recalls that he grabbed
her from behind and tried to pull her down, but after a few moments of struggle she was able to
escape. At book fairs and festivals, Asal also complains that men intentionally brush up against
her body and grab her. Negar has also had similar encounters with men, who she says, are taught
from early on to perceive women only as sex objects. The tendency by men to perceive women
as sexual objects, according to most of the participants, are grounded in patriarchal customs
rooted in the customs and traditions of Iranian history.
When asked whether women are able to fight back and resist, Negar argues that while
younger women are more vocal against male perpetrators nowadays, Iranian men continue to
maintain the victimized status in these situations. Perceived as temptresses and seducers, women
who publically speak out against sexual harassment and sexual violations are all too quickly
blamed for their perpetrator’s sexual violations. While Negar contends that American women do
not experience these kinds of injustices, there are many women’s rights advocates who would
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argue otherwise. The vilification of scantily-clad women as “enticers” of male sexual aggression
is a frequent point of contention for women’s rights advocates in the West.255 In fact, only
recently young American women took part in “slut walk” protest marches, which have been
spotted across the nation in cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, and Boston. These protests have
grown out of what many women’s rights proponents hail as yet another instance of victimblaming in cases of sexual assault. When a Toronto police officer advised against “dressing like
sluts” in order to avoid rape and sexual assault, young women took to the streets in what has
quickly snowballed into an international movement to combat sexual double standards that exist
in cases of sexual violence. Shifting the blame from the female victims to male sexual aggressors
is central to this movement’s objective.256
How do these recent events in North America compare to Negar’s perspective of
American culture and ideals of female sexuality and agency in this country? While Negar agrees
that women’s bodies are sexually objectified both in America and in Iran, it seems as though she
is willing to accept the beautification of women’s bodies in America at face value without
challenging the underlying principles of the standards on women’s sexuality and femininity in
this country. But after talking about this for some time, Negar reasons that because women’s
bodies “are restricted” in Iran, “it is not normal for men to see women” and so there is a constant
desire to “discover them,” she says. In America, the visual appearance of women’s bodies is
unrestricted and thus, she argues, normalized in public spaces. She says that both American and
Iranian cultures sexually objectify women’s bodies in public spaces and concludes that, “I don’t
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think it is good to make use of women for advertising, but putting restrictions [on women’s
bodies] will have negative effects. It should be balanced, I guess. Not this, not that.”
Subversion of Authority
Encounters with the morality police were frequent occurrences for many of the interview
participants and their friends. Several have been publically chastised for violations of the Islamic
dress code and for socializing with peers of the opposite sex. Others have been arrested on
numerous occasions because of their flagrant violations of State-imposed policies. Iranban and
her boyfriend were able to evade arrest by corroborating a story about their supposed
engagement and upcoming wedding, a kind of ‘backup plan’ which they used when stopped by
the authorities.
Like Leela and Iranban, Asal has also subverted authority during her adolescence.
Although Asal has largely averted direct encounters with the country’s morality police, her
subversion of prevailing regulations on inter-religious and inter-ethnic dating has created
significant tension within her family and community. As teenagers, Asal and her Muslim
boyfriend would secretly ‘hang out’ together, violating both her Armenian community’s social
norms as well as the government’s laws on unmarried men and women socializing with one
another. Her boyfriend would drop her off in a neighboring area to walk the remaining distance
home, so as to avoid a potentially violent encounter with Armenian men in her community. “I
didn’t want him to come there, because especially the young boys of the neighborhood they
know this guy isn’t Armenian, there will be a fight there, this has happened before.” Although
Asal was aware of the risks of having a romantic relationship with a Muslim man, including
community isolation and familial tension, this was a price Asal was willing to pay. In hindsight,
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Asal says, “I knew that this would be the circumstance [with my family]. This is the consequence
of what I did.”
In June 2009 Leela and her husband took part in the protests following Iran’s presidential
elections. For both of them, participating in such a momentous historical event gave them hope
that political change was possible in their country. “At that time,” Leela says, “we thought that if
these protests continue for two more weeks things will change [in this country]. The people were
so united in the protests, you could see people from different generations, we all were united, a
person like me and a religious person with a long veil.” At the same time, Parastoo Sarashaar
joined in a rally protesting the outcome of the elections from Chicago, where she says fellow
Iranians came together in support of the peaceful demonstrations taking place in their home
country. For Leela, participation in the protests signified a greater opposition of State-imposed
policies.
Cultural Discrimination in Chicago
While in Chicago, several of the participants have recounted significant instances of
cultural discrimination, and have as a result suffered intense loneliness and isolation. For
Iranban, who has endured a significant amount of harassment because of her Iranian/immigrant
identity, seclusion became a form of self-induced isolation against what in her mind, had become
a hostile environment. On reflecting on her six month seclusion in her apartment, Iranban says,
“Sometimes I think that there is so much weight that [Iranians] carry here. I feel like I don’t
count as a human in the United States because I don’t have a proper ID.” In one instance, when
a cashier refused to sell Iranban cigarettes because she wasn’t able to read her student visa
clearly, she recalls how humiliating this experience was: “So I opened the visa page, and she
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started checking the extension, but she said I cannot give you cigarettes. So, I was like, are you
the immigration police? And I was so pissed, that is so embarrassing. There are a bunch of
people in line and they are looking at you. First of all, the picture of you is in the scarf, and [they
think] uh oh, there is one terrorist over there.” In recalling these experiences, Iranban says,
“Everything here is tough.”
Unlike Iranban, Parastoo vocalized her opposition toward the racism she experienced by
challenging individuals head-on. Citing specific instances of personal hardship since arriving in
America three years ago Parstoo argues,
You have to do a lot [in America] to gain at least half of what you have in your own
country. You speak the language, you know a lot of people, you know a lot of networks,
you have the support of your family and friends. But here, you’re nothing! You don’t
have any meaning! No one knows you! So, you have to start and build everything from
the beginning.
When asked whether they experience greater forms of political and/or social agency in America,
the participants have responded with mixed answers, citing that both places present distinctive
opportunities and obstacles for women. What the participants have made explicitly clear in their
narratives is that resistance, whether against the State, patriarchal traditions, parental or
community authority, or against religious ideals, is a constant presence in their lives in Iran. The
‘discursive formation’ of State ideologies has left no area of their personhood untouched,
therefore propelling them to recreate a ‘youthful’ identity outside of the prevailing regulations.
For several of the participants, life in Chicago has brought with it a unique set of
unanticipated challenges, including bearing the social stigma associated with their Iranian
immigrant identity. This has, I would argue, at times stifled their ability to engage in subversion
or resistance of these reductionist categorizations, and prevented them from immersing
themselves more fully as contributing members of society. This was definitely the case for
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Iranban, who was unable to confront individuals who stigmatized her. Also, several of the
participants like Leela and Iranban are prohibited from working in Chicago due to their own Visa
stipulations. Others have been unable to afford the high cost of universities as international
students living in the U.S.
Perspectives on Women’s Dress Code, the Veil, and Fashion
Each interview participant has experienced instances of sexual harassment in Iran. Like
Negar, most argue that it is a commonplace occurrence and that Iranian men are trained to
perceive women as sex objects. Instances of verbal aggression, as well as pinching and grabbing
were the most frequently noted forms of sexual aggression the participants have encountered.
While they have emphasized on separate occasions that not all Iranian men engage in this
behavior, the more important point the participants articulate has more to do with the overall
ineffectiveness of women’s modest clothing on men’s sexually aggressive behavior, a fact which
contradicts the notion that an Islamic dress code prevents women from seducing men. If
anything, the participants argue, covering women’s bodies has only enticed younger men to
further act out their sexual aggression against them. Women’s bodies, they argue, have become
even more sexualized because they are not visible.
The purpose of shrouding garments like the chador and hejab not only maintains
women’s honor and ‘ideal’ Islamic identity, but is said to also protect men from succumbing to
women’s sexual enticement. After the revolution, some of Iran’s Islamic clergy argued that even
the presence of women was said to “undermine men’s better judgement,” and that the sexual
arousal caused by women can disrupt the moral social order integral to Iranian Islamic society.257
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Perhaps, as Negar suggests, women’s bodies have become more sexualized as a result of their
relative invisiblity from public view. The need to ‘discover’ them is largely a result of their
subsequent shrouding, which has in turn further sexualized their bodies in public settings.
Still, most agree that Iranian men are trained to perceive women as sex objects, and that
Iranian society places value on women only according to their sexual and reproductive
capabilities. While they agree that women’s bodies are also sexually objectified in America, the
participants argue that by and large instances of sexual harassment are far fewer in the United
States, and that overall feelings of security and safety on the streets are greater here than in their
home country. While this may be true, it seemed as though there was relatively little critical
analysis of the perception of women in American society by certain interview participants. For
example, Negar, who experienced significant harassment in Iran because of her large chest size,
argued that in America having large breasts is perceived as a positive female trait by men. When
asked whether she had ever experienced harassment or male attention in the U.S. because of her
chest size, Negar responded, “No, never.” Surprised by this response, I in turn argued that
women frequently experience sexual harassment and objectification because of this very physical
attribute. Although Negar insisted that she had never witnessed or experienced these kinds of
interactions, I believe this conversation demonstrates more broadly an uncritical acceptance of
the sexual expectations of women in America. While Negar believes that women are both
sexually objectified throughout American and Iranian media and in commercials, it seems as
though certain aspects of Western sexual double standards have been largely accepted at face
value, without critically engaging the objectification of young women’s bodies that occurs within
this process.
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While activists have worked against women’s sexual objectification and double standards
throughout Western First- and Second-Wave feminist movements,258 recent critiques of sexual
double standards have focused largely on the representation of women in media and
advertisements as a problematic representation of the ‘ideal’ Western woman. The negative
effects of these representations—those that glorify hyper-sexuality, thinness, enhancement of
breast size, and superficial beauty—have come under the fire of feminist media critics who in
turn deplore these tactics, particularly since many of them target young girls in their adolescence
and youth.259 Furthermore, activists have pushed for legislation which mandates full disclosure
of photograph’s that have been ‘photoshopped,’ a computer program commonly used to
manipulate commercial photographs by ‘retouching’ and ‘enhancing’ flawed aspects of people’s
bodies. According to Tim Lynch, an image-retouching expert, almost 100% of all photographs
published in magazines “are retouched in some way or another.”260 The negative effects of
photoshopping on young women, according to numerous psychologists, media experts, and
academics, has led to low self-esteem, poor body image, and unrealistic body standards. Even
more disturbing are the high percentage of eating disorders, most notably anorexia and bulimia,
among young women, which is further perpetuated by unrealistic representations of women’s
bodies used in media and advertising.261
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Furthermore, young women are subject to a culture of hyper-sexualization, particularly in
pop culture and in various musical genres, including pop, rap, and hard rock.262 Young women in
recent decades, including the likes of Britney Spears and more recently, the Pussy Cat Dolls,
have created an entire pop icon out of hyper-sexuality where certain traits of their bodies,
including their breasts, largely define their public identity. For example, in recent years one
Chicago radio station ran a contest called, “Boobies like Britney,” that advertised the following:
“Wanna be like Britney?...You’ve watched her grow into every guy’s fantasy slave. Now you
want what she’s got?” The prize for this contest included a $5,000 award, which as author Carol
Platt Liebau argues, is “enough, presumably, to cover [the expense of] breast augmentation
surgery.”263 Here young women are rewarded for emulating a pop icon who has largely defined
herself with her sexuality.
Rap stars are no less at fault for perpetuating the sexual violence enacted on women
through mainstream music culture. Award-winning rapper Nelly repeatedly demeans women in
his music videos and has recorded a smash-hit song called, Pimp Juice, which was widely
received by young fans of rap music.264 Using works like pimps and ho’s throughout his music,
Nelly is only one out of numerous rap artists who demean women through the use of sexually
violent language.265 How are young women who are mostly influenced by youth pop culture
supposed to navigate and circumvent sexual double standards that perpetuate female sexual
subjugation? It is clear based on these examples, that young women are taught early on that the
key to “fitting in” and to social acceptance by their male peers includes having ‘large breasts’ or
by succumbing to sexually aggressive language and behavior.
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While it may seem that women are indeed praised for having ‘large breasts,’ whose
benefit will this ultimately serve? How are young women able to have agency in any of these
situations without resisting these standards entirely, thereby disassociating themselves from
mainstream youth pop culture? It is clear that the structural inequality clearly favors male
sexuality and domination, while perpetuating misogynistic ideals within youth culture. This is, as
feminists like Jean Kilbourne demonstrate, what contemporary Western and Middle Eastern
feminists are trying fervently to fight against.
Encounters with the Morality Police and Religious Authorities
Each participant has recounted specific run-ins with the morality police on issues of
clothing and modesty. The resistive strategies employed against the moral authorities have,
according to some of them, grown stronger in recent years. For Parastoo, State-imposed policing
of the body is unnecessary and an invasion of her personal rights. Recalling her own experiences
with university authorities, she says the following:
They just stop you [and say] don’t you think that your headscarf, or your clothes, or your
makeup is not appropriate for this Islamic country? I think what the hell? I don’t give a
damn about this Islamic country. You know, people are angry, because we have a lot of
financial problems, we have a lot of, you know, social problems and the only thing you
care [about] are my clothes? Let me be free and I can take care of myself. I am not a
prostitute. I want to be respected. People are just frustrated.
Others have echoed similar sentiments of frustration and anger toward the government’s
regulations on women’s physical appearance. Upon exiting an aircraft from an international
flight, Negar recalls how humiliating it was that morality police checked women’s attire as she
and fellow female passengers exited the plane. Iranban feels that no one should have control over
her appearance or her body. Parastoo even talks about how she has witnessed the female morality
police act hypocritically and flirt with their male counterparts.
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It’s really humiliating. And then you see them talking with each other and kind of,
flirting. They’re wearing chador and you can see just their eyes and they do whatever
they want with those eyes. I was like, what are you really looking for? They’re sick and
they look at us with those sick eyes and they interpret whatever they see with their sick
minds. And that’s why they don’t let us talk with each other or wear whatever we want.
Resistance against regulations on clothing has become an integral part of Iranian
women’s lives. Nowadays, Leela says, “There is a constant war in Iran between women and the
regulations. But the girls and women, they fight.” While entering her university, Leela recalls a
run-in with a woman who patrolled the entrance for dress code violations. Accusing her of
wearing a manteau (an overcoat worn over the clothes) that was both too short and too tight,
Leela says, “They just wanted to bother me a little. It’s a childish game.” Women are becoming
increasingly vocal against the morality police, suggests Leela, and on several occasions she has
even witnessed women stopped by the morality police begin to shout in order to draw a crowd
and protest. In the summertime, Leela says that women wear brighter clothes, shorter pants, and
nail polish, despite the government’s regulations. “We tried colorful scarves, we had scarves for
winter, different ones for summer, and then we made fashion out of it,” she says. Those who can
afford it purchase the latest high-end manteaus created by Iran’s best female fashion designers.
Parastoo even talks about how women use makeup as a way to “look sexy” and to rebel against
the government’s regulations. She says, “In Iran, women kill themselves to wear makeup.”
While clothing trends and makeup are often used to make fashion statements, in what way is
Parastoo’s sentiment representative of other women’s indiscriminate acceptance of consumerist
culture that glorifies women’s beauty along these lines? How are women exercising effective
‘resistance’ against the State or better yet, exercising agency, by wearing a heavier makeup
application? Furthermore, how do wearing shorter pants or more colorful clothes offer more
opportunities for strategic subversion of the State’s policies? As both Leela and Parastoo argue,
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women’s bodies have become a space for political opposition and subversion of prevailing
regulations. Still, I would argue that the ultimate beneficiary of these fashion trends are not
women, and that such beauty standards are centered around the male sexual gaze.
Likening it to a “game with the regulations,” Leela believes that women in Iran care more
about their appearances than American women as a way to compensate for the State-imposed
dress codes.
In Iran, whenever women want to go out, sometimes I feel that they even pay even more
attention to the things that they wear, because they need to substitute the need, you
know? You cannot show your hair….I told you it’s like a game, playing with
regulations….I think women [here] are free to act as they like and they wear what they
feel comfortable [wearing], but in Iran you work on your appearance, because you cannot
work on something else, so you work on your makeup.
In this way, women take an active role in the consumption of market goods (like global fashion
trends, designer clothing, and trendy makeup) as an attempt at creating an alternative cultural
identity outside of the ideologies of the State, which polices the representation of women’s
bodies in public spaces. Still, I question the underlying principles of this argument, because it
ultimately applauds women’s efforts at sexualizing their own body’s vis-à-vis trendy clothing
and through heavy makeup application. While it is clear that all of the participants outwardly
oppose the sexual objectification of women’s bodies, there seems to be an unwillingness to
critique the consumption of these global trends simply because they subvert the State’s
regulations on women’s dress, despite the fact that these clothing trends among Iran’s middleand upper-class secular populations are becoming increasingly sexualized (tighter, shorter, and
more form-fitting).
This kind of subversion has in many ways been accepted at face value without
considering the impact it potentially has on women’s sense of self or ability to exercise agency.
With the formation of the Islamic Republic, the covering of women’s bodies (through chador
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and hejab) represented the country’s national Islamic honor. In the early years following the
revolution, the concealment of women’s bodies from public view was said to “…bestow respect
and dignity on [them].” Clergy argued that the chador and hejab provided women with
“…deliverance from the yoke of imperialism” and was a “symbol of liberation, and resistance to
capitalism, and revolutionary aspirations.”266 The consumption of globalized fashion trends,
particularly in the form of colorful, silk-woven hejabs, while it has allowed young women to
subvert the State’s regulations, I believe has only perpetuated the sexual objectification of
women’s bodies in public spaces.267
While women are required to wear the hejab in Iran, none of the participants in this
research believe in its religious purpose and refuse to wear it in America. “I just used to wear a
coat and a scarf on my head pushed back,” Iranban exclaims and laughs. At home in her
apartment in Tehran, Iranban wore only a tank top and shorts while she socialized with her
female roommates in the open stairwell of her building, where she says, pedestrians were able to
see her. She wore less modest clothes intentionally, she argues, so that, “whatever [people] want
to think, they should get used to it. I wear this on purpose. You should see this and just get used
to it.” Sometimes Iranban’s neighbors would even stare at her for long periods of time, which she
thinks they enjoyed, but she said, “believe me, after two weeks, it became usual.” While Iranban
ultimately doesn’t know what her neighbors thought of her, or whether her behavior was
‘accepted’ or disapproved of, her actions, she claims, were intentional forms of subversion
against the State’s regulations on women’s bodies. She believes that after sometime the visual
presence of her body became normalized.
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Michel Foucault argued that the conditions upon which “discursive formations” are
created are based on “rules of formation,” created by the ideological and philosophical tenets
upon which power and knowledge are interchangeably created and transformed.268 Iranban’s
actions, therefore, challenge the discourse of gender representation in public spaces in Iran.
Drawing on both Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler theories on gender and power, Iranban’s
actions challenge dominant religious ideologies about women’s bodies by subverting the social
norms and practices imposed upon her by the State. By engaging this otherwise ‘ordinary’ act of
resistance in a relatively public space, Iranban ultimately renegotiated the discourse of gender
representation by challenging the prevailing norms on the presence of women’s bodies. In public
spaces, she in turn created an alternative representation of gender identity that subverted the
dominant State discourses. Not unlike countless other women in contemporary Iran, these acts of
defiance are representative of a greater movement by Iranian women that resist prevailing norms
that propagate their legal and social inequality. Furthermore, by resisting the Islamic Republic’s
prescribed norms of men and women, the mission of the Islamic Republic—to create and sustain
an ‘ideal’ Islamic society—is challenged.269 Still, her actions are representative of individual acts
of resistance, and differ markedly from a young woman who might engage in political activism
as a journalist or a student activist.
When asked why she doesn’t wear a veil, Parastoo, who comes from a highly religious
family, replied, “…because I don’t believe in it. For me, hejab doesn’t mean to wear something
that covers your whole body. For me hejab means not allowing people to look at you as a sex
object. I mean hejab is not in your clothes, it’s in your manner, it’s in your attitude. You know
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you’re a woman, you can talk with your eyes and your attitude.” For Parastoo hejab is a state of
mind. All of the other participants have expressed similar sentiments.
How does this revelation in many ways demonstrate how Parastoo has rejected the
dominant discourses of the State? The ideological and religious values endorsed not only by the
State, but also by modern-day interpretations of patriarchy, valorize female sexuality purity,
while simultaneously demonizing those women who do not adhere to these ideals. Islamic
tradition creates a sexual hierarchy based on the idea that women have a moral obligation to
fulfill the sexual desires of her husband. Although Islamic law also mandates a husband’s sexual
obligation to his wife, the hierarchy of the male-female sexual binary is clearly constructed in
favor of men’s sexual fulfillment and female sexual suppression.270 Within Islam there is an
intense fear over women’s seductive powers, which can potentially detract men’s attention from
God, and which in turn can disrupt the entire Muslim social order based on a strict hierarchy of
the sexes.271 While similarly sexual hierarchies exist in Christian tradition, there is the
assumption that women’s sexuality in Christianity is passive. Moreover, in Islamic sexual
discourse women are presented as active, sexualized beings, whose sexuality must be harnessed
and channeled.272 For Parastoo, Iranian women are reduced to mere sexual objects because of
the forced separation produced by the veil. Their bodies become sexualized because they are
‘forbidden’ and ‘hidden’ from public spaces.
While the participants agree that on a whole they experience less sexual harassment in
America, several have suggested that American culture places greater emphasis on sexualizing
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women’s bodies in public spaces. They further contend that American society places much
greater value on women’s physical appearance and that superficial qualities, like a woman’s
physicality, her career achievements and monetary value, are used to gauge a woman’s worth.
Iranban and Leela have both emphasized these points throughout our meetings, and both agree
that the picture they once had of America in their minds is not everything it claims to be. Leela
says,
When I came here I really thought that [America] is the land of opportunity, but when I
arrived here I saw people in the streets, homeless people, I saw the discrimination
between whites and blacks. Yes, you cannot say anything about it; you have to pretend
that it’s ok. Yes, it is a land of opportunity, for a person who is a genius, or who has a lot
of money….I’m happy for this experience and the opportunities that I can have, but now
I don’t think that I would be happy with this life. It’s the last chance, it’s painful, it’s not
happiness, it’s your last chance because there is nothing left in your country.”
In many ways, Leela and Iranban’s experiences highlight the superficiality of American culture.
Feelings of intense loneliness, isolation, and separation from a community at large are the
primary reasons that neither Iranban nor Leela see their long-term futures in this country.
Household Dynamics: Family, Relationships, and Women’s Self-Determination
In discussions about household dynamics, participants reflect on their upbringing and
childhood experiences, as well as their experiences with dating and marriage. As young women,
most of the participants were raised in households that encouraged women’s independence and
self-determination, although this varies considerable for several of the participants. “I grew up in
a family that respects girls, that doesn’t make a difference between girls and boys. They give me
enough confidence to fight for my rights,” Negar says. They encouraged self-sufficiency, but as
Negar suggests, there are still many women in Iran bound to age-old traditions of familial and
marital dependence. Even if certain women, usually from smaller cities or rural areas, want to
leave their husbands and return to their families, Negar says that they are unable to.
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For Leela, home-life was a place of political radicalism, a place where her educated
mother taught her about the importance of women’s rights and the abuses of power by the
country’s religious leaders and authorities. “My mother talked with me a lot, about the things
that happened to our country, and she was tough about it. She really did not want me to become
religious…because she knew that it’s a kind of limitation,” she says. As a secular political
scientist, Leela’s mother is a source of inspiration because she says, “She sees the world through
a good point of view, she really does not like any kind of limitation, or restricted ideas, or
radicalism.” Opposition to the prevailing norms and subversion of the prevailing regulations has
been a constant theme throughout Leela’s life, whose secular parents were staunch opponents of
the revolution.
Unlike Leela, Parastoo’s religious upbringing shaped her sense of self and identity as a
young girl and woman. Raised in a small city outside of Tehran, Parastoo’s parents who were
strong proponents of the revolution and are supporters of the reformist and Green Movement,
instilled in her a strong sense of religiosity and a desire to accomplish her expected role as a
‘good’ daughter and wife. For Parastoo, adhering to her family’s religious ideals of Islam was
absolutely essential as a child and young adolescent. As a child, Parastoo learned early on that as
a female, her primary duty was to grow into a dutiful wife, who took on the responsibilities of
cooking, cleaning, and managing the house. “I didn’t want to be someone else’s wife,” Parastoo
says, “I didn’t want to live someone else’s life.” During our conversation, she explains that even
in conversations with her friends, some of whom came from more secular families, the social and
familial expectations imposed upon them were identical. “It didn’t matter if you came from more
religious, or more intellectual families, our memories are all the same,” she argues.
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Parastoo is a highly thoughtful and intelligent young woman, who describes herself as a
‘rebel’; and for her, resistance has always been an essential part of her being. Still, her first
conversations with adult men outside of her family came much later, at the age of eighteen,
where in absolute secrecy she developed a relationship with a man ten years her senior.
Suspecting that his daughter was romantically involved with a man, Parastoo’s father threatened
to kill her, but she argues that she thinks he was really only trying to scare her. Virginity prior to
marriage was absolutely essential for Parastoo and despite her father’s warnings; she fell in love
with the man. Although Parastoo argues that his intellectual leanings were open-minded, she
soon learned that even with a man who supported human rights and equality, sexual double
standards were pervasive. “He wanted to have sex with me because I was a virgin,” she explains,
even though he had previously intimated that he had romantic feelings for another woman. His
character was full of “contradictions,” Parastoo recalls, since he privileged his sexuality over
hers, something that was very difficult for her to understand at the time.
For most of the other participants dating was allowed prior to marriage, but with certain
limitations. Many were able to go out to the movies or to dinner with their boyfriends, or to each
other’s houses, despite the government’s restrictions on inter-sex mingling. In fact, Iranban dated
her boyfriend for ten years before they got married, and Leela frequently visited her boyfriend’s
home and socialized with his family. But today, Leela argues, circumstances have drastically
changed. As a young woman in her early twenties, Leela recalls that her parents would have
never allowed her to go on vacation with her boyfriend or to stay out until two or three a.m. But
now, even when she speaks with her girlfriends who have younger sisters, they recognize how
significantly youth have changed:
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I have a friend, she could not go on a trip with her boyfriend. But the younger sister? She
does that, in the same family….All of my friends who have a sister, the limitations
[today] are totally different….We went to parties, we went out a lot, but we had to be at
home at twelve, not later than that. And not every night…Now, [my friend’s] sister goes
to parties every night, she stays out until two or three a.m., but her parents can’t do
anything. They tried, but they couldn’t control her. And she drinks a lot.
When asked if this was typical of younger people in the early twenties, Leela argues, “Nowadays
it’s common, you cannot easily control this generation, around twenty to twenty-four. Like, the
sisters of my friends. So, these things even happen in the same family. The older girl is totally
different than the younger one.”
Iran’s increasingly rebellious youth population has drawn considerable attention in recent
years, and subversion of State regulations has become integral to their cultural ‘youth’ identity.
In an analysis of social discontent, Authors Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri echo similar
sentiments,
The baby-boom generation of the early years of the Revolution and the war with Iraq
does not remember—or care for—the experiences and beliefs that are at the core of the
regime’s claim to legitimacy. This is particularly true of the progeny of the urban middle
class….These is nothing to indicate that this saturation of public space with the
hegemonic discourse reaches its intended audience. Neither can one avoid the evidence
of resistance to this kind of propaganda….”273
While this passage refers directly to youth resistance of State-sponsored propaganda (posters and
religious murals), it also speaks to a broad culture of resistance that permeates Iran’s youth social
landscape. While Leela admits that her actions as a teenager were consistently measured in terms
of subversion or evasion of prevailing regulations supported by the State, she argues that today’s
younger generation engages in rebellious behavior that would far surpass that of her generation.
While subversion of State rules and regulations may very well empower today’s youth and
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propel them to engage in defiant behavior, how does the consumption of alcohol, drugs, or
increased sexual activity for that matter, improve women’s social status or change young
people’s lives in the long-term? While these young women engage in personal acts of
subversion, perhaps against parental authority or because they want to ‘defy’ the State’s
regulations on young people’s behavior, I would argue that these behaviors position women in
vulnerable situations that open up opportunities for date rape or other forms of sexual violence,
and do very little in terms of improving opportunities for women to exercise agency.
Permissive Styles of Parenting
Indeed, permissive styles of upbringing have been one of the most effective methods of
resistance for mothers of the revolution. Children born during the years following the revolution
have been witness to the State’s most extreme forms of policing, including a strict Islamic
education, and uniform dress codes.274 Permissive forms of parenting have been used as strategic
forms of resistance against the State’s regulations, which in the years following the revolution,
were one of the most effective methods employed by young mothers of the revolution. Azadeh
Kian-Thiebaut argues the following,
Child centeredness and the weakening of parental authority accelerate the process of
individualization among the youths who develop individual strategies vis-à-vis other
members of the family. Through the means that parents, especially mothers, have
provided to their children, they have facilitated their opening to the modern world, and
have encouraged them to internalize western values thereby opposing the regime’s forced
Islamization policies.275
By and large the most influential presence in the women’s lives includes the parental guidance of
the parents, and the value system instilled in them as children. Many of the participants attribute
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their resistive nature to the parenting styles, which in many ways mirrored the permissive nature
Kian-Thiebaut examines in the previous passage. For many of them, this has included
questioning their religious and cultural environment, including those social norms that perpetuate
male chauvinism and misogyny in public spaces and society.
In a recent interview with an eighteen year-old Iranian woman, author Pardis Mahdavi
documents one adolescent’s motives behind her rebellious behavior: “We recognize the
consequences of our partying, but we do it anyway. It’s kind of like an F-you to the system, if
you know what I mean; it’s our way of protesting. That’s half the reason we party so hard and
engage in such sneaky and risky behavior.”276 The desire to engage in rebellious behavior is, as
this young woman indicates, a kind of resistance against the State-imposed restrictions on
behavior and dress.
Dynamics of Marriage
When Iranian women marry, there is often a sense of freedom that still accompanies this
act, Leela explains. Quite often, women use it as a way to escape the constant presence of their
families.
For me, I got married nearly five years ago and I’m happy to choose my husband…,but I
had depression after my marriage because of the life that I experienced. I did not find
myself as a woman before marriage. So, after marriage I began to understand myself, and
to know myself better. But I was married! You know? And, it was like everything was
finished and it was a sense of depression after that because I felt that I wanted to
experience the world in other ways. After my marriage I felt that I didn’t have enough
freedom to know about my desires as a woman.
Having only dated three men, she says, was not enough for her to really know them, mentally and
sexually. “I found out that my soul, my thoughts needed to be involved more in the world of
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men. It was both sexual and at the same time intellectual,” Leela says. Although Leela says that
she is happy she stayed with her husband because she loves him, she knows many women in Iran
who married as a way to gain independence and freedom from parental authority, but who are
now involved in extramarital affairs with other men. Even though Leela argues that young
women do live alone on occasion, it is still not common in modern-day Iran. Marriage, quite
often is an escape and a route to independence for young Iranian women.
I wanted to experience a life on my own before getting married, but I didn’t have that
opportunity, you know?....I really do not like this part of my life. I even thought of
getting divorced, but since I had a happy life, and I knew that this is not a problem of my
husband, this is a problem with my identity, with my social identity, with my personal
identity.
In our discussions of husband-wife relationships, Iranban and Leela emphasize how
supportive their husbands are in terms of personal and career development. While Leela argues
that life as an unmarried woman might be easier in America, she says she can’t be sure. In cases
of adultery, Leela argues that the social repercussions for women are much greater in Iran than in
the States. “For example, if a man has an [extramarital affair] it is not good, it is not good at all,
but the family tries to accept it, society tries to accept it. But if the woman cheats on the man, it
is a disaster.” While Leela argues that women have more ordinary rights in their individual lives
in the States, it is clear based on her own accounts that there is a strong desire to subvert
traditional ideals of women’s sexual purity before marriage. She says,
If someday I have a girl, I think, ok, I really need her to be mature enough to have sex. I
really do not know what is the exact age for a girl to be mature enough to have sex. Not
as an obligation, it’s her right. But I want her to have the experience before marriage. I
know that this experience changes your point of view. When a girl does not experience a
sexual relationship before marriage, she sees marriage as something that is very special.
Arguing that sexual intimacy encourages a heightened sense of self-awareness, Leela says that
pre-marital sex is absolutely essential for young Iranian women and men to realize and discover
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their “sexual needs and sexual desires” before marriage. Since coming to America, she has found
that women in this country appear to have a much easier time engaging in sexual intimacy
because it is relatively socially acceptable and normalized in Western society. It is as a result of
years of suppression, Leela says, that many of today’s Iranian women are sexually active prior to
marriage. The need for sexual intimacy and a desire to rebel against the State’s sexually
repressive regulations “…make the teenagers of today the wild teenagers,” Leela says. “They
have sex, sometimes they have sex with two or three people, there’s no thought after the sex,
before the sex, wrong marriages, easy divorces after that. I think these [behaviors] are the result
of these repressions.”
A Sexual Revolution
In recent years, Iran’s younger population has engaged in what has been called a sexual
uprising against a confining political and social environment. Increasingly, young men and
women are engaging in romantic relationships outside of the confines of traditional, religious
customs as a way to express their defiance of a government that has significantly repressed their
generation.277 In many ways, Iran’s sexual revolution has become a space for young people “to
express their dissent” against a sexually repressive government, and as a way to recreate a social
identity outside of the confines of State-imposed religiosity and sexual conservatism.278
Much like the sexual revolution of the 1960s in America, or the conservative, evangelical
Republican era during the 2000s, the sexual revolution is situated within a period of intense
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political and social transformation within Iran specifically and within the region more broadly.279
During the 1960s and well into the 70s, America’s ‘sexual revolution’ challenged conventional
notions of sexual morality, abstinence, and pre-marital sex. The changing ideological landscape,
as authors like David Allyn argue, came largely as a result of increased access to literature on
human sexuality as well as greater access to contraceptives and a sex education curriculum that
replaced “…scare tactics with explicit visual aids and practical information.”280 This period,
accompanied by intense political upheaval and protests, witnessed greater instances of premarital sexual activity among younger people, as well as an increasingly sexualized commercial
and media industry. For many, the sexual revolution brought a sense of ‘freedom’ that came with
this unabashed sexuality, however, for most feminists during this era the ‘sexual’ revolution
represented the epitome of female sexual objectification.281
Only four short decades later, America underwent a radical shift to the Right in its
political and social leanings. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 and the
election of conservative, Christian Republican George W. Bush to the presidential office,
American society entered a decade of relative moral conservatism.282 The convergence of
Christian evangelicalism and Republican political agendas after September 11th gave way to
American nationalism subsumed with conservative, religious rhetoric and an aggressive
“national power” that promised to avenge any and all aggressors against the nation.283 During
this time, issues such as abortion, same-sex relationships, marriage, female reproductive health
(including access to contraception), and rape were discussed in such a manner that discriminated
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minority groups and disadvantaged populations. Youth sexuality was largely discussed in terms
of a pro-abstinence rhetoric, and abortion was condemned by ultra-conservative groups who
argued against it even in instances of rape and incest.284
It comes as no surprise then that young individuals participate in sexually subversive
behavior as a way to circumvent the conservative social mores of the State’s Islamic ideology as
a way to bring about social change.285 Indeed, attitudes toward sexuality have in recent years
witnessed a significant change in Iran’s public spaces. In her ethnographic research, author
Pardis Mahdavi recounts the substantial social transformation she has witnessed among young
people and in Iranian society in recent years:
….Young adults are now seen engaging in romantic acts with members of the opposite
sex in public spaces. There have also been shifts in how sexuality is talked about in
present-day Iran, and many of these changes have been politicized….It is clear that
young people are striving to create the space in which to publicize dialogue about
sexuality and accommodate a changing sexual culture.286
While Pardis Madhavi offers up an in-depth analysis of the sexual behavior and attitudes
of Tehran’s middle-upper-class youth population, at times it appears as though she ascribes the
same celebratory discourse of “consumption” to Tehrani women who apply heavier makeup and
who wear more revealing clothing. She writes,
Women in Tehran now wear relaxed Islamic dress along with layers of mascara, eye
shadow, and lipstick. Their sense of self (which for some is gained when they enter
college) is manifested on the street; in their own words, “makeup is our political
resistance.”….So their sense of style, comportment, and outward appearance is linked to
their agency, resistance, and sense of self and citizenship….”287
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Except for the fact that she inserted this passage just after she interviewed a female informant
who described how she uses her body and sexualized appearance to interact with men as a way
to navigate otherwise trivial ‘everyday’ activities (like going to the store) and as a way to receive
positive male attention.288
By practicing sexually “defiant” behavior, youth are engaging in sub-altern movements
that challenge the dominant discourse of conservative traditions and religious ideology supported
by the State. This does not mean, however, that young men and women are judged by their peers
equally, or that the expectations for women’s sexual propriety are not still framed within the
discourse of female sexual purity and virginity. While it may appear that young people are
indeed more tolerant of open sexual relationships with multiple partners before marriage, this is
perhaps the worst kind of uncritical acceptance of sexual double standards that are still stacked in
favor of men.
The expectations of virginity prior to marriage, for example, continue to persist despite
the changing sexual landscape among Iran’s younger population. For example, in a recent review
of Shahram Khosravi’s Young and Defiant in Tehran, Norma Claire Moruzzi argues against his
indiscriminate acceptance of the “Americanized, consumerist Iranian identity” that is so
prevalent among Iran’s middle- and upper-class urban youth.289 What Khosravi fails to consider,
as Moruzzi suggests, is that while these youngsters engage in what many have celebrated as
quintessentially ‘modern’ behavior (such as frequenting upscale malls in northern Tehran and
engaging openly with individuals of the opposite sex), the rules of engagement are still written
according to modern-day interpretations of patriarchy and male privilege. This is perhaps one of
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the biggest downfalls of the celebratory discourse of consumerist culture in Iran as elsewhere
(including the United States), as it continues to subject women bodies to sexual objectification
and uneven expectations of sexual propriety.
So, if women make themselves more visually ‘available’ to the public vis-à-vis tighter,
more revealing clothing, how are they gaining or even exercising agency in these situations?
How is this improving women’s social status or increasing their sense of ‘citizenship’? If
anything, these trends demonstrate rather crudely how a younger generation of wealthier Iranians
are engaging superficial standards of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’ vis-à-vis consumption and in
turn, are linking them to really significant ideas like ‘agency’ and ‘resistance.’ While it is clear
young people are utilizing fashion trends to subvert State-imposed policies that attempt to
regulate public appearance, I would argue that if anything, these kinds of practices are
detrimental to women’s social status in Tehran (as elsewhere), and that they only serve to sustain
patriarchal norms.
Strategic Subversion
Parastoo’s story is unlike any of the other participants. Coming from a religious family
required a great deal of familial involvement in her engagement and marital process, and she was
prohibited from accompanying her soon-to-be husband unattended outside of her home until
after they were married. Subversion for Parastoo meant working within the confines of the
‘system,’ she argues, because she realized early on that she could only live a meaningful life with
a partner who valued her completely and not simply based on her capacity to function only as a
‘wife.’ Working against the social and religious boundaries of her family and community were
integral to her daily life as an adolescent and young adult. Using this knowledge, Parastoo says
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she strategically became involved in a non-profit organization as a way to interact with other
boys her age. She says that while boys would never have been able to call her family’s home
prior to her volunteer work, interacting with other boys under the pretext of ‘doing good work’
made this suddenly possible. After one year at the organization, “…my father would answer the
phone and a boy would ask for me, and it was ok,” she says laughingly.
Marriage life for Parastoo has not always been easy, but she says that her husband has
changed since they first were married and that their relationship has improved. She financed their
marriage counseling in Iran, something which gave her strength given the enormous weight of
familial stress in the situation. Dealing with his sister and mother-in-law has perhaps been the
most painful experience for Parastoo, who she says, expected her to be nothing more than a
traditional wife who cooks, cleans, and takes care of her husband. Well before they came to
America, Parastoo pushed the social boundaries of ‘traditional’ marital relationships by
“practicing equality” with her husband, something which she says his mother and sister did not
instill in him at an early age.
Like many other Iranian women, Parastoo challenges the acceptable social and religious
norms of husband-wife relationships by insisting on more egalitarian practices within her home.
Moreover, Parastoo is unwilling to accept her mother- and sister-in-law’s dominant presence in
her marital relationship, whose interference in her life early on in her marriage was almost
unbearable. Charging her with asserting too much independence and authority in her new
marriage relationship, both sister- and mother-in-law accused her of trying to gain ‘status’ in the
new family. Although they did not live together, she cites instances of ‘interference’ and
‘meddling’ by these two female relatives, who she argues, failed to instill in her husband a sense
of domestic obligation and marital partnership. In traditional Muslim communities, patriarchal
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customs ensure women’s dependence on her husband’s family early on, including the matriarch
of the household, the husband’s mother, who often uses her status as an older woman and mother
to exert her authority over the young bride. The life cycle of a newlywed woman within her
husband’s family is, as Deniz Kandyoti argues,
…such that that deprivation and hardship she experiences as a young bride is eventually
superseded by the control and authority she will have over her own subservient
daughters-in-law. The cyclical nature of women’s power in the household and their
anticipation of inheriting the authority of senior women encourages a thorough
internalization of this form of patriarchy by the women themselves.290
By not “internalizing” the norms of patriarchy meant that Parastoo constantly worked
against the confines of cultural and religious ideals that subordinate her role in her marital
relationship. When they came to America, Parastoo says that she cut off all communication from
her husband’s family, and that he doesn’t ask her to speak with them on the phone either because
she says, he knows how she feels about them. Well before they came to America as a married
couple, Parastoo pushed her husband to participate more in the domestic responsibilities and at
one point, challenged him to cook every night for one week so that he could understand the
challenges of working a double-duty shift, as an employee and student during the day and as a
housewife at night. “He failed the challenge,” Parastoo says, and has since taken on more
responsibilities within the home.
For Parastoo, “practicing to be equal” implies an inversion of the status quo, within the
dynamics of her marital relationship and with her husband’s family. By challenging the cultural
and religious norms of familial and marital relationships, Parastoo is reinventing a gender
identity outside of these norms that perpetuate women’s subjugation within her and her
husband’s home.
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Parastoo’s present-day resistance is an example of what Simone de Beauvoir and Betty
Friedan argued decades prior in the mid-twentieth century; that ‘femininity’ is not based on
‘inherent’ or ‘natural’ biological traits, but that women’s domesticity is based on socially
constructed cultural norms, which relegate women to the home as caregivers of children and
subservient wives.291 The fulfillment of ‘femininity’ in the guise of these ‘natural’ traits is what
both de Beauvoir and Friedan argued was situated at the center of women’s social suppression.292
By working against these socially constructed norms, women have over time been able to
transform social attitudes about issues such as women’s employment, motherhood, and husbandwife relationships. For a woman like Parastoo, these acts of resistance and defiance against the
social expectations of young, newlywed brides have worked as effective tactics to combat
women’s suppression.
Women’s Perspectives on Personal Beliefs, Values and Self-Expression
Like Leela and Negar, Iranban was raised to be a self-determining and autonomous
woman. Although her father is a religious man, Iranban argues that he never tried to force his
religion on his children, and instead, encouraged them to determine their own values and belief
system on their own. Unlike Leela, Negar, and Iranban, Parastoo was raised in a very religious
household in a small city north of Tehran. As a teenager Parastoo explains that she began to
question her faith in Islam. In a recent conversation, Parastoo explains how difficult her decision
not to veil must be for her parents:
I never talked with them about it, and they never asked me. But I guess they know,
because they know me. I was always a rebel, and I didn’t want to wear hejab or chador,
and they know that. But they don’t want to talk about it because it’s not easy for them to
291
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accept, so they prefer to say nothing about it…You know, you have to have meaning for
what you are doing.
Blindly accepting the State’s Islamic ideals and regulations is something that Parstoo is not
willing to engage in. She has asserted these opinions in opposition to not only the State’s
regulations on women’s physical appearance, but also against her family’s more religious
traditions on female propriety and comportment. Navigating these two separate landscapes—an
otherwise repressive State and society’s changing expectations of young women is something
that Parastoo has to engage in on a daily basis. She attributes this to her own intellect and
introspection, despite being raised in a household that demanded religious adherence and
discouraged alternative ideals and values.
Deniz Kandyoti’s ‘Patriarchal Bargain’
In her analysis of women’s resistance in Muslim societies, Deniz Kandiyoti employs the
phrase “patriarchal bargain” as a more accurate description of men’s domination over women
and female sexuality throughout time. The term “patriarchy” in and of itself implies a constant,
static, and unchanging social script that controls and regulates the attitudes and perceptions of
acceptable female behavior in any given society. However, its transformation is evident
throughout history, as Kandiyoti argues, and has influenced women’s submission to and
resistance to its shaping of their lives.293 A “patriarchal bargain,” therefore, involves women’s
strategic balancing of acceptable social norms and their simultaneous advocacy toward greater
gender equality.294 “Patriarchal bargains….influence both the potential for and specific forms of
women’s active or passive resistance in the face of their oppression.”295 The resistive strategies
employed by the interview participants, whether in the form of dress, sexual intimacy, or through
293
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self-expression, constitute a ‘bargaining’ process through which State regulations and social
norms are continuously subverted, refuted, and refined.
Perceptions of Women’s Social Status in America
When asked whether women enjoy a higher quality of life in America, Leela responds
that she is unsure. While she believes that women enjoy greater ordinary rights in America, she
is unsure whether all women are awarded equal social opportunities. “Yes, it is better here,
because you have more freedom here, but that does not mean that you are happy.” As an Iranian
woman, Leela argues, she is certain that she would not be given the same professional
opportunities as say, an American woman might be awarded. She argues this might also be the
case for Hispanic and African-American women as well. A strong emphasis on financial success
and individualism comprises an aspect of American culture that Leela does not identify with or
find appealing. “Money is so important in America, you know, you have to be in power in
America when you earn money,” argues Leela. However, Leela argues that as an Iranian woman
in America she has greater opportunities to “find herself” in this country, where she does not
experience the same State-policing and regulations as in Iran. “A woman here is more involved
with herself,” she says.
Like Parastoo, Leela and Iranban have articulated their dissatisfaction with the American
‘image’ and culture they have experienced thus far. Prior to her departure for the States, Leela
recalls the reaction of her peers, “When we wanted to move here and I was kind of depressed,
someone told me you are stupid, you are going to America….In Iran, [people say] you are going
to America, do you know, do you understand this opportunity?.....I think that if I want to
continue living in America, I should be another kind of woman, not the kind of woman that I
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am.” Issues like discrimination, homelessness, income disparity, and extreme financial
competitiveness comprise those characteristics of American culture that have largely shattered
the image of America presented to young individuals like Leela and Iranban in Iran. Iranians
who had previously lived abroad present an image of America that depicts a land of perfection
and flawlessness.
For Iranban and Leela, America was presented to them as the land of equal opportunity;
however, this image has been contradicted by their experiences. Extreme capitalism encourages
values like individualism, financial competitiveness, and social inequality neither Iranban nor
Leela identify with or find fulfilling. For Iranban, her time in America has been an incredibly
lonely experience. “I felt that I’m so lonely, I felt that people they didn’t treat me well. I thought
that I was the loneliest person in the world.”
For Iranban, American women’s political and social complacency has also destroyed her
image of a country that in her mind was a global leader in the history of women’s rights
movements and civic activism. Based on her own observations, Iranban believes American
women are often judged by their financial worth, status of employment, their bodies and sexual
appeal, as well as their accomplishments as mothers and wives. “It’s about mastering your life,
American women master their lives,” she argues. Her perception illustrates more clearly the
double standards by which she believes American women are judged, something that I believe is
not taken seriously enough in this country. Pressures of marriage, motherhood, while
simultaneously excelling in education and employment (in addition to financial gain) are real,
daily pressures that exist for young women in this country. Iranban and Leela have also observed
a lack of cultural depth and community membership in America, and feel that people in America
are incredibly disconnected from one another. “The focus is always on the individual,” Leela
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argues. Both women believe that a sense of community belonging and cultural identity are
important elements to living a high quality of life. Leela admits, “I’m happy for this experience,
but now I don’t think I would be happy with this life [here].”
Chapter 4: Conclusion
Summary of Study: Statement of the Problem and Specific Research Hypotheses
As a backdrop to my analysis, I have underscored the significance of Iran’s nationbuilding and modernization projects in the country’s recent history. Utilizing Michel Foucault’s
theory of power and knowledge, as well as Judith Butler and Siomone de Beauvoir’s theories of
gender, I have incorporated gender and national identity into my analysis of Iranian women’s
social and political status. By comparing the evolution of gender and national identity in Iran
with relevant examples throughout history, such as Poland after the end of the Cold War, there is
a clear linkage between Iran’s social and political progression with the evolution and
construction of women’s gender identity in terms of religion, sexuality, and as members of an
Islamic community.
While one of the objectives of this research includes an analysis of women’s stories of
resistance and subversion in Iran, the primary purpose of this ethnographic study was to examine
the extent to which immersion in American culture changes Iranian women’s selfconceptualization. Throughout my historical and theoretical analysis, as well as within the autoethnographic writing of these women’s stories, I have worked against the assumption that
Western culture “liberates” or “saves” Middle Eastern women from cultural and religious
victimization in their homelands. Rather, I have used this opportunity to demonstrate how certain
aspects of mainstream Western culture, such as the media, consistently engage in epistemic
violence against Middle Eastern women both in their description and visual depictions as either
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‘exoticized’ or ‘veiled,’ passive and silent, and victimized. Throughout these women’s stories, it
has become even more evident to me the impact the impact that cultural discrimination has had
on these women’s ability to exercise agency. They have recounted how on numerous occasions
they have had to negate assumptions made about their social and political backgrounds, as well
as reductionist interpretations of their ‘Iranian’ and/or ‘Muslim’ status.
Moreover, the assumption that Western culture would naturally “save” Middle Eastern
women from their otherwise “victimized” status has otherwise been debunked by these
participants’ personal narratives. While these stories include only a small sampling of personal
accounts, their experiences as students, professionals, and everyday citizens are not unlike the
experiences of other Iranian immigrants who have recently come over to the United States.296
The obstacles these women have encountered are in many ways more broadly representative of
the hardships many Middle Eastern women encounter when they immigrate to the United States
as foreigners from a non-Western country.
Summary of Methodology
Selected methodology has centered primarily on ethnographic data, and has also included
a secondary analysis of academic and scholarly literature in the areas of critical and comparative
gender studies, anthropology, and transnational feminist scholarship. The population selected for
this research study was delimited to young, educated, middle- to middle-upper class Iranian
women born during or after the revolution of 1979. The significance of this particular population,
as I have demonstrated throughout these pages, lies in their ability to navigate and negotiate State
regulations that continue to limit women in areas of citizenship and social engagement, as well as
296

Patricia E. Darlington and Becky Michele Mulvaney, Women, Power, and Ethnicity: Working Toward Reciprocal
Empowerment (Binghamton: The Haworth Press, Inc., 2003), 146.

- 115 -

in a society that has in many ways encouraged women’s social participation, but that is still
framed within the context of patriarchy and male privilege.
The theoretical framework of this project is grounded in transnational feminist theory and
praxis. The parameters of this research have been centered on inverting Western hegemonic
discourses by replacing them with alternative narratives about women from the Middle East.
Feminist ethnography has aided me throughout the interpretive process by positioning these
women’s voices central to the writing process, while simultaneously engaging their responses,
contradictions, and assumptions with critical dialogue and feminist theory. I have made every
attempt to ensure that the words I have chosen as well as the quotations I have used have not
been taken out of context or misappropriated in any way. Continual conversations about
interpreting their words have been necessary to ensure that the probability of epistemic violence
was diminished. Interviews were analyzed according to four themes, which included resistance,
issues of dress, the shifting dynamics of household relationships, as well as women’s values and
self-expression. Questions of agency and autonomy have been central throughout the research
process.
Conclusions and Implications of Study
While several of the women have been awarded excellent educational opportunities
throughout the Chicago-land area, the social obstacles they face as ‘foreigners’ within local
communities have been extraordinarily painful, causing significant feelings of loneliness and
depression. Several have also observed the presence of structural inequalities and discrimination
in local Chicago communities and the sexual subjugation of women in mainstream American
society. This has only exacerbated the separation many of them already feel from their home
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country and homesickness for their families and community networks.297 While a few of the
participants have connections within the local Iranian diasporic communities, most have
distanced themselves from other Iranians, made friends with non-Iranian individuals, or kept to
themselves entirely. This is, according to Parastoo, Iranban, and Leela, not only because of
competition that exists between young Iranian women as a way to gain social status within the
Iranian diasporic community, but also because of the ongoing social unrest in Iran. For some of
the women, there are feelings of sadness and depression because of the current political climate
in Iran, which has in many ways prevented them from fully acclimating to American society and
to other Iranians living in Chicago. All women have articulated this sentiment on separate
accounts, and according to them, many of the same pressures they faced in Iran (sexual pressure,
peer pressure, and competition among women) have intensified in among younger Iranian
women living in Chicago.
Both Leela and Iranban have intimated that the separation from their country has been
extremely painful, particularly during periods of social unrest, increased protest activity, and
during heightened periods of government crackdowns. Despite these feelings of homesickness
and sadness, many have welcomed this new environment as a much-needed change from daily
life in Iran. As Leela intimated during one of our discussions, “The only thing that I do wish
every minute is that my country becomes a stable one, you know? There [are] no more wishes
for me and so many people in my generation.” Throughout our conversations, several of the
participants have also talked about how unencumbered they feel as young women living in
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America. Savoring ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ activities, like cycling in public, smoking in the
streets, or dressing without thinking about violating dress-code regulations have overall been
extremely exhilarating for most of them.
Still, it is evident based on their experiences as young women in both Iran and America
that they have experienced and employed as much, if not more, agency and resistance in their
home countries than as young women immersed in Western culture. In many ways, the epistemic
violence imposed upon them—as Iranian/immigrant women—in the media and in interactions
with other Americans, has as Parastoo indicated, only ‘re-victimized’ the very status which they
have so vehemently tried to disavow.
Moreover, in telling me their stories they have been explicit in categorizing their
experiences in Iran as ‘resistance’ or ‘negotiation’ against various institutions of authority
throughout their adolescence and young adulthood. The significance of individual ‘subversion’
(as with dress) or ‘evasion’ (as youngsters evading rules in school), I think, demonstrates the
importance of personal resistance in these women’s lives as methods used to exercise agency
against the State and against the limitations of society at large. The problem with some of these
practices, as others have argued, is that the consumption of many global trends, particularly in
terms of women’s clothing, makeup, and sexuality, has not increased women’s ability to exercise
agency or bring about lasting social change. Instead, these practices have pigeonholed many
young, middle- and upper-class women into highly sexualized roles within a youth culture that
simultaneously glamorizes female sexuality, yet still condemns women who engage in sexual
relations outside of the dynamics of marriage. The double standards implicit within these
attitudes about female appearance and sexual behavior has not been critically questioned within
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the greater discourse about consumption as a means toward ‘liberation’ or as a means to
ultimately increase women’s ability to exercise agency.
This is in no way meant to diminish the severity of women’s legislative restrictions that
are deemed just in the eyes of the Islamic Republic or the methods used by the women who act
against them. Women are still restricted in areas of marriage, divorce, and citizenship rights and
their individual rights are largely bound and determined by their living male relatives.
Compulsory veiling, temporary marriage, and exclusion from many areas of political
participation were some of the major blows enacted against women after the revolution.298
Iranian women have, however, engaged in what author Sanam Vakil has coined the “quiet
revolution” in the past three decades, by subverting limitations and pushing social boundaries
against an oppressive and oftentimes violent religious government.299 She writes, “They have
played a decisive role in elections, assumed political posts, and now outnumber men in all arenas
of education.”300 It is precisely because of these restrictions, that these women’s stories
demonstrate their unyielding strength and fortitude in the face of innumerable social obstacles
and legalized discrimination.
For many of the participants, the opportunity to study in America signified more broadly
an opportunity to actively engage a global youth culture, and to further advance their university
education and professional goals. While many of their experiences in Iran highlight the regime’s
fierce and often ruthless tactics to subvert opposition against State authority (most recently
demonstrated in 2009 in the violent crackdown against peaceful protesters) these stories have
298
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underscored how effective resistance and subversion are in engendering long-term social change.
Still, I believe based on these stories, and the scholarship that has recently been written about this
specific population in Iran, fails to critically address the repercussions of using ‘dress’ or
‘sexuality’ as a means to subvert State regulations or to improve the societal expectations of
women at large. This is where feminist scholarship that considers issues of gender and class can
expose some of the bigger problems that exist within these kinds of assumptions.
Future Research and Looking Ahead
There has been an enormous generosity of spirit demonstrated to me by each of the
women throughout our conversations and interviews. These women have been generous both in
their time and in their willingness to share private thoughts and their personal stories in order to
make this project possible. Our conversations flowed naturally, and by and large the women
engaged in story-telling about their personal experiences as students and professionals living in
Iran and in Chicago. Conversational reciprocity and active listening are according to Aihwa Ong,
necessary components of ethical anthropological research and “highlight alternative circuits of
discursive power.”301 Taking into account these power dynamics throughout the ethnographic
process has helped me critically engage my own voice throughout the writing process, while still
challenging assumptions or commonly held beliefs expressed by the participants.
While I have admittedly struggled with the politics of studying ‘outside’ of my own
social location, as a non-Iranian and Western woman, I believe I have engaged the contentions of
Western and transnational feminist scholarship in a constructive and critical way. Drawing
attention to the problematic nature of these kinds of inquiries, I think, has only helped me
301
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transform the theoretical components of transnational feminism into applied praxis and a more
concrete understanding of the implications of this kind of research. Utilizing these critical
lessons in theory and praxis has also further prepared me for future research on gender and
sexuality within diasporic communities.
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